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"DEALING WITH" EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN
NONUNION WORKPLACES: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TEAM
ACT AND ELECTROMATION
Michael H. LeRoy*
No one can question the rightness of a policy intended to preserve the integ-
rity of collective bargaining by labor representatives free of interference from
management.... But this poliy becomes too much of a good thing when it
is pushed so far as to leave no place for a bona fide, socially desirable em-
ployee committee or joint employer-employee committee that is something less
than a labor organization and something more than a Great Books Study
Group.
-Judge John Minor Wisdom
NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co.'
Cabot Carbon's rejection of the notion that "dealing with" is synonymous
with collective bargaining failed to delineate the lower limits of the conduct:
if "dealing with" is less than bargaining, what is more than?




More than sixty years have passed since the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) was enacted with the purpose of redistributing eco-
* Associate Professor, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, and College of
Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I am grateful for insights shared by
Samuel Estreicher, Mark Barenburg, John Raudabaugh, Bruce Kaufman, and Wayne
Probst. Errors of commission or omission are mine alone. This Article is dedicated to
the life and charity of my grandmother, Corinne Schultz, and to the birth of my son,
Samuel Paul LeRoy.
1 289 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1961) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
2 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1002 (1990) (Devaney, concurring).
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nomic power to ordinary workers.3 At the time of its passage, three
distinct methods of employer-employee dealing existed.4 Employers
dealt with individual employees,5 or a union of employees, 6 or a com-
pany union.7 Senator Robert Wagner, sponsor of the NLRA (Act),
3 See Sen. Robert Wagner's insight when he introduced the bill that eventually
became the NLRA:
The law has long refused to recognize contracts secured through physical
compulsion or duress. The actualities of present-day life impel us to recog-
nize economic duress as well. We are forced to recognize the futility of pre-
tending that there is equality of freedom when a single workman" with only
his job between his family and ruin, sits down to draw a contract of employ-
ment with a representative of a tremendous organization having thousands
of workers at its call. Thus the right to bargain collectively, guaranteed to
labor by section 7 (a) of the Recovery Act, is a veritable charter of freedom of
contract; without it there would be slavery by contract.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS Acr 20 (1985).
4 U.S. DEr. OF LABOR, CHARACTERisTICs OF COMPANY UNIONS 2-3 (Bull. 634,
1937).
5 The Department of Labor's exhaustive study of 14,725 workplaces in 1935 sum-
marized this form of dealing:
[T]he employer personally, or through his foreman or personnel director,
negotiates with his employees individually. The employer may occasionally
call a meeting of his employees to make an announcement or for purposes
of general discussion. A temporary workers' committee may sometimes be
appointed to act upon a particular matter. Essentially, however, relations be-
tween the employer and the employee remain on an individual basis, and
there is no permanent or formal organization of workers with duly consti-
tuted representatives to carry on negotiations.
Id. at 2.
6 This form of dealing consisted of
negotiations with a trade union. Individual grievances and the detailed in-
terpretation and application of agreements are sometimes handled through
shop committees, but broad questions of wages, hours, and working condi-
tions usually are negotiated through representatives or agents of the trade
union who need not necessarily be employed by the establishment or
company.
Id. at 2-3.
7 The Department defined a company union as:
an organization confined to workers of a particular company or plant, which
has for its purpose the consideration of conditions of employment. When
this method of handling labor matters was carried on by informal commit-
tees, the whole arrangement was commonly referred to as an "employee-
representation plan." The term plan is hardly suitable, however, in cases
where more formal procedure has developed, such as written constitutions,
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viewed company unions as shams designed to frustrate genuine union
organizing.8 Consequently, section 8(a) (2) of the Act prohibited em-
ployer domination or interference with a "labor organization"9 ; and
section 2(5) broadly defined a "labor organization" to include com-
pany unions and numerous alternatives to employee representation.' 0
The first two methods of employer-employee dealing are clearly
in evidence today. Among the almost 90% of private-sector employees
who have no union representation," individual employment contracts
are common.' 2 Unions, although suffering declining membership,
are still a force in many work settings.'3
8 He justified introduction of the National Labor Relations Act by observing:
The greatest barrier to [employee] freedom is the employer-dominated
union, which has grown with amazing rapidity since the passage of the Re-
covery Act. The employer-dominated union generally is initiated by the em-
ployer. He takes part in the determination of its rules, its procedures, its
policies. He can terminate it at will and he exercises absolute veto power
over its suggestions. Certainly there is no real cooperation on an equal foot-
ing between employers and employees under such circumstances.
Id. at 38-39.
9 Section 8(a) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contrib-
ute financial or other support to it.. ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1996).
10 This provision did not name company unions as such, but rather defined them
in functional terms as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee rep-
resentation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 29
U.S.C. § 152(5) (1996). This definition is widely understood to encompass employee
representation groups that cannot properly be called company unions. See NLRB v.
Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. 203, 210-14 (1959).
11 Union Membership Declines by 100,000 to 16.3 Million, or 14.5% of Workforce, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, D-14 (Jan. 29, 1997) [hereinafter Union Membership], reports
on a U.S. Department of Labor survey showing that in 1996, there were 9.4 million
union members in private, nonagricultural industries. Union density was 10.2% of
private-sector wage and salary jobs, down from 10.4% in 1995. Id.
12 The securities industry has pioneered a relatively new form of individual-deal-
ing by requiring employees to arbitrate employment disputes. See, e.g., Patrick
McGeehan, Bias Panel Is Formed by NASD, WALL ST.J., May 29, 1997, at C1. In Gilmeer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the Supreme Court validated this
form of dealing by holding that employee agreements to arbitrate employment dis-
putes are not precluded by employment discrimination laws.
13 See Union Membership, supra note 11, at D-14 (showing that concentrated pock-
ets of union membership remain in transportation and utilities (26.5% unionization),
precision production, craft, and repair employees (23% unionization), and construc-
tion (18.5% unionization)).
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The existence of the third method of dealing is now hotly dis-
puted. The TEAM Act,14 a bill to amend section 8(a) (2) of the NLRA
by permitting more dealing between employers and employees with-
out a union intermediary, is the focus of this heated debate. Since the
bill was introduced, numerous law review articles have examined em-
ployer dealings with nonunion employee groups.15 Empirical re-
14 S. 295, 105th Cong. (1997) and H.R. 634, 105th Cong. (1997), would amend
section 8(a) (2) of the NLRA by striking the semi-colon and inserting the following:
Provided further, That it shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under this paragraph for an employer to establish, assist,
maintain, or participate in any organization or entity of any kind, in which
employees participate to at least the same extent practicable as representa-
tives of management participate, to address matters of... quality, productiv-
ity, efficiency, and safety and health, and which does not have, claim, or seek
authority to be the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees or
to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements ... between the
employer and labor organization, except that in a case in which a labor or-
ganization is the representative of such employees as provided in section
9(a), this proviso shall not apply.
Id.
15 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatorj Management Within a Theoty of
the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657 (1996) (advocating participatory management within a
theory of corporate governance); Jon Blumenthal, Remedying Electromation, Inc. v.
NLRB and its Progeny: The Future of Employee Participation Programs, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 193 (1996) (arguing that section 8(a) (2) of the NLRA is outdated); Rafael Gely,
Whose Team Are You On?My Team or My Team?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 323 (1997) (taking
a skeptical view of participatory programs from an internal labor market perspective);
William B. Gould IV, Employee Participation and Labor Policy: Why the TEAMAct Should Be
Defeated and the National Labor Relations Act Amended, 30 CREIGroN L. REv. 3 (1996)
(arguing that his theory of employee participation, as set forth in Keeler Brass Automo-
tive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995), should be the basis for amending section
8(a) (2)); Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Putting Worker-Management Relations in Context: Why
Employee Representational Choice Needs Greater Protection in Reform of Section 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA, 34 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 53 (1997) (viewing the TEAM Act as a needed response
to protect employee involvement groups); Robert B. Moberly, The Worker Participation
Conundrum: Does Prohibiting Employer-Assisted Labor Organizations Prevent Labor-Manage-
ment Cooperation?, 69 WAsH. L. REv. 331 (1994) (concluding that although section
8(a) (2) has largely eliminated company unions, it remains a relevant safeguard for
union organizing); Anna S. Rominger, Rethinking the Paradigm: Can the Wagner Act and
Labor-Management Cooperation Coexist?, 8 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 159 (1996) (arguing that an
adversarial model of labor-management relations is no longer appropriate); Madelyn
C. Squire, Electromation: A Metaphor for the Ills of the NLRA- Is a Representation Stan-
dard a Cure?, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 209 (1996) (arguing for a "reasonable belief'
standard to justify an employer's imposition of an employee representation commit-
tee); Sandra L. Nunn, Comment, Are American Businesses Operating Within the Law? The
Legality of Employee Action Committees and Other Worker Participation Plans, 63 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1379 (1995) (examining the general characteristics of QWL, Quality Circle, sur-
vey feedback, and other employee representation plans); Note, Labor-Management Co-
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search has considered related matters, such as employee interest in
alternative forms of workplace representation 16 and the effect of em-
ployee involvement programs on worker preferences for traditional
unions. 17
This academic research has not occurred in a vacuum. The AFL-
CIO, organized labor's main federation, has challenged the TEAM
Act, contending that it would return employer-employee dealings to
the stilted form of company unions.'8 Interestingly, occasional advice
operation after Electromation: Implications for Workplace Diversity, 107 HARv. L. REv. 678,
685 (1994).
16 See Richard Freeman &Joel Rogers, What Do Workers Want? Voice, Representation
and Power in the American Workplace, 50 PROC. OF NEW YORK UNivERsnY FirimTH AN-
NUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Samuel Estreicher, ed., forthcoming December 1997).
Based on the second wave of their survey, which sampled 800 employees, Freeman
and Rogers concluded: "In general, Wave Two showed that employees see current
company efforts to involve them in company decision-making and open door policies
as real and desirable. But they want more and greater involvement in decisions, for
their own sake and for the sake of the firm." Id.
17 SeeJim Rundle, Winning Hearts and Minds: Union Organizing in the Era of
Employee Involvement Programs, Cornell University and AFL-CIO Conference Paper
(Washington, D.C. 1996) (copy on file with author). This study of 165 NLRB repre-
sentation elections showed that unions encountered an employee involvement pro-
gram in 38% of their campaigns, up from 7% since 1988. It found that unions won
48% of the elections where no employee involvement program existed, but only 32%
where such a program was in place. Rundle concluded:
In less than ten years, employee involvement programs have grown from a
blip on the radar screen to a significant new phenomenon facing union or-
ganizers. They are now encountered by organizers in one third of all or-
ganizing campaigns. For all the hope that some academics have bestowed
on them as vehicles for improving employee 'voice' in an increasingly non-
union work world, the ones the organizers encounter are far from benign.
They are accompanied by aggressive anti-union campaigns, and as employee
organizations, are utterly undemocratic.
Id.
18 See Jonathan Hiatt's (General Counsel for the AFL-CIO) 1997 testimony
before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, stating that
while some employers backing this legislation may want to "empower" em-
ployees to make decisions on the job, the very last thing these employers
desire is a work force that is genuinely empowered in its dealings with man-
agement-that is, a workforce that can deal with the employer on an equal
footing in determining the terms and conditions of their employment. In-
stead, the thrust of this legislation is to further empower management's uni-
lateral control over those terms and conditions.
The Teamwork For Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act of 1997: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL
8218929 (testimony of Jonathan Hiatt, General Counsel for the AFL-CIO); see also
Robert Muehlenkamp (Director of Organizing for the Teamsters), contending that
"this change in the law would deny employees the right to be represented by someone
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articles in human resource (HR) management publications lend some
support to their view.19
Employers sharply counter that progressive HR management en-
tails legitimate employer-employee dealings, such as jointly solving
workplace problems that affect everyone.20 Since this kind of interac-
tion is common and is linked to higher growth rates for firms,2' this
organizational form has important implications for the American
economy. Their point is strengthened by the fact that employee own-
ership of firms is rising and the linkage between this kind of owner-
ship and employee involvement improves firm performance. 22
independent from the employer, as currently guaranteed by section 8(a) (2)." The
Teamwork For Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act of 1997: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL 60522
(testimony of Robert Muehlenkamp Director of Organizing for the Teamsters).
19 For example, Jonathan A. Segal advises that
employee involvement teams can be formed to give employees a feeling of
empowerment. However, these teams may run afoul of the NLRA's Electro-
mation ruling. Although there are some risks inherent in any meaningful
employee involvement program, these programs should not be avoided alto-
gether. The risks can be minimized with the help of experienced counsel.
Jonathan A. Segal, Keeping Norma Rae at Bay: Discouraging Unionization through Better
Personnel Management, HR Mag., Aug. 1, 1996, at 111, available in 1996 WL 9969489,
advises that
20 See William Budinger's testimony concerning his small nonunion firm, where
health insurance costs were rising more than 20% per year in the early 1990s. His
testimony is relevant to the TEAM Act because his firm solved its health insurance
problem by using an ostensibly unlawful form of employer-employee dealing:
Several production people, a researcher, a scheduler, and a human re-
sources professional formed a team and began interviewing their families,
other employees, health care professionals, and other companies. After
nine months of work, they came up with a new idea-replace our traditional
health-care program with a wellness program that invested in preventing ill-
ness rather than just curing it. We installed the wellness program and dis-
covered that it measurably improved the well-being of our people. At our
annual health fair, we've found that we're thinner, fitter, healthier, and
smoke less on average than we did five years ago.
The Teamwork For Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act of 1997: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of William Bud-
inger), available in 1997 WL 60501.
21 See Employee Participation Programs Spur Fast Growth Companies, Coopers and
Lybrand L.L.P., "Trendsetter Barometer" Survey Shows (visited Aug. 24, 1997) <http://
www.colybrand.com/eas/trendset/106.html>. The Coopers & Lybrand survey found
that 8 in 10 of the fastest growing firms in the U.S. have employee participation pro-
grams, and also found a correlation between those firms that most highly value these
organizational structures and those firms' growth rate.
22 See A Statistical Profile of Employee Ownership (visited Aug. 24. 1997) <http://
www.nceo.org/library/eostat.html>. This survey showed that 8.7 million employees,
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As this public policy debate occurs, the character and functions
of employee teams are steadily evolving. The most notable change is
that teams are redistributing power in the workplace. Team-based
management is increasingly used as a substitute for traditional man-
agement of work by supervisors.23 While cost-cutting appears to moti-
vate some of this change,24 creation of a shared decision-making
culture appears to be a more common purpose in giving workers
more authority. The changing definition of a front-line supervisor's
role in managing work is evidence of this change.2 5 The transition
as of 1996, participate in ESOPs and stock bonus plans, and reported that a 1987
NCEO study based on a survey of 45 ESOP and 225 non-ESOP firms showed that
employee ownership combined with a participative management style had 8% to 11%
more growth compared to conventionally owned and managed firms.
23 A forceful presentation of this link appears in Jeffrey E. Myers, Downsizing
Blues: How to Keep Up Morale, MM-r. REV., April 1, 1993, at 28, available in 1993 WL
2942783 ("When team building is already in place, use of this practice can have the
benefits of involving more workers in downsizing decisions, facilitating communica-
tions regarding downsizing and the rationale for such moves .... Special attention
must be given to employees who fall in the 'middle-manager' classification. These
individuals suffer particularly heavily in a downsizing.").
24 See, e.g., Robertshaw, USWA & IAMAW: Tennessee's 1995 Labor-Management Part-
nership Award Winner, TENN. TRm., Oct. 12, 1995, at 10, available in 1995 WL 15505588
(reporting an agreement by an employer and union to respond to global competition
by replacing salaried supervisors with hourly working coordinators).
25 General Electric's reorganization of its Financial Services Organization (FSO),
provides a good example:
For the most part, the major Work-Out themes that were repeated through-
out the town meetings-participation, empowerment, and teamwork-were
received enthusiastically by FSO's rank-and-file workers. In local "sensing"
sessions, in which senior managers met with small groups of people for
roundtable talks, employees seemed eager to become more involved and
willing to take on more decision-making responsibility.
Middle managers and supervisors were more reluctant to embrace these
new organizational values. Besides feeling threatened by what they per-
ceived as the loss of power and authority, many found it impossible to imag-
ine working in an organization where they didn't have to spend their time
checking and correcting what other people did, intervening to solve
problems, and running day-to-day operations.
To win these people over-and to neutralize any potential resistance to
the change effort-FSO implemented a series of training workshops specifi-
cally designed for supervisory personnel. Called the Leadership Challenge,
these sessions helped raise awareness by modeling the new roles that manag-
ers would play in a more participative environment and by outlining the
attributes that characterize the successful modem manager.
Robert Frigo & Robert Janson, GE's Financial Services Operation Achieves Quality Results
Through "Work-Out"Process, NAT'L PRODUCrIVrrY REV., Dec. 22, 1993, at 53, available in
1993 WL 2946165.
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from a traditional system of work-management to one that provides
employees more autonomy is hard for some people to accept.26
Employers embrace this change, notwithstanding its unsettling ef-
fects, because it holds out untapped gains for them and their employ-
ees. Teams provide flexibility in responding to fast-changing
markets. 27 They also provide a limited antidote to some of the harm-
fil outgrowths of rapid change, such as high rates of employee and
customer turnover, and are therefore viewed as a good business prac-
tice.28 Teams sometimes benefit employees by aligning their compen-
sation with an employer's growth. Gainsharing, one method for
aligning these interests, is often applied in teams. 29 By making teams
accountable to customers or "end-users" of an organization's goods or
services,30 alignment of employer and employee interests is also
strengthened.
In an interesting turn of events, employers, perhaps emboldened
by team successes, are giving teams more functions. Shifting the man-
agement of diversity from HR professionals to teams is a daunting ex-
ample. Still in an experimental phase, this appears to result from HR
managers' twin identification of employee involvement and diversity
management as today's defining workplace issues.31 Only a few large
employers have given teams a broad mandate to manage diversity.
26 See, e.g., Evelyn F. Rogers et al., Self-Managing Work Teams: Do They Really Work?,
18 HUM. RESOURCE PLAN. 53 (1995), available in 1995 WL 14336389 (concluding its
case study of a restructured restaurant business and stating that "[t]he organization
learned that it was much harder to convert a traditionally managed group to a self-
managed group than one expected").
27 See JEFFREY GOLDSTEIN, THE UNSHACKLED ORGANIZATION: FACING THE CHAL-
LENGE OF UNPREDICTABILrlY (1996), (providing recent examples of these uses). See also
Bernard Portis & Neil Hill, Making Employee Participation a Way of Life: Four Experiences,
33 NAT'L PRODUCIVITY REV. 481 (1991), available in 1991 WL 2818447.
28 This thesis is set forth in FREDERICK REICHELD, THE LOYALTY EFFECT: THE HID-
DEN FORCE BEHIND GROWTH, PROFITS, AND LASTING VALUE (1996).
29 For an accessible and informative explanation of gainsharing, see Understand-
ing Gainsharing (visited Aug. 24, 1997) <http://wmjackson.com/Understand-
ing.html> (copy on file with author) (explaining that this system requires employee
involvement, communication, rewards for meeting goals, and dollar-based formulas;
and distinguishing gainsharing from profit sharing and piecework).
30 This appears to be true even in the public sector. See Dawn Anfuso, City of
Hampton: A Public Deployment of Corporate Tactics, PERSONNEL J., Jan. 1995, at 70. The
article describes Hampton, Virginia's successful adoption of team-based organization
and subsequent requirement that teams survey customers to determine their satisfac-
tion with city services.
31 See, e.g., Kathleen Menda, Policy Flaws Show Need for Reform, HR MAG.,June 1995,
at 133, available in 1995 WL 12309856 (reviewing EDWARD E. POTTER & JUDITH A.
YOUNGMAN, KEEPING AMERICA COMPETITIVE: EMPLOYMENT POLICY FOR THE TWNIY-
FIRST CENTURY (1995)).
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Xerox's program has been highly successful,32 but R.R. Donnelley's,
though well-intentioned, may have aggravated existing racial and gen-
der tensions.33 United Airlines reports a more typical experience.
There, teams are handling a limited diversity issue that has everyday
import: flexible scheduling, particularly for employees who have
child-rearing or elder-care responsibilities.3 4
B. Organization of this Article
This Article adds new evidence about employer-employee deal-
ings in nonunion work settings to this public policy debate. It builds
on my 1996 Notre Dame Law Review article 35 that the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee later examined in its deliberations over
the TEAM Act.36 That article surveyed 23 nonunion work teams scat-
tered throughout the United States, and found that (1) most teams
were small; (2) almost half the teams only made suggestions to man-
agement, and therefore, did not even meet the threshold require-
ment of "dealing with" an employer so as to constitute a section 2 (5)
labor organization; (3) most teams handled work process or product
quality issues, in apparent conformity to guidelines set forth in Electro-
mation and DuPont, (4) two-thirds of the teams were created by man-
agement; (5) recruitment of non-supervisory employees to be team
32 See Matti F. Dobbs, Managing Diversity: Lessons from the Private Sector, 25 PuB.
PERSONNEL MGMT. 351 (1996), available in 1996 WL 10845155; Xerox Wins Award for
Making Diversity WoAk, WoRx & FAM. NEWSBRmF, Dec. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL
10431843.
33 See Alex Markels, A Diversity Program Can Prove Divisive, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30,
1997, at B1, available in 1997 WL-WSJ 2407638, which reports on a discrimination
lawsuit seeking millions of dollars in damages that stems from a team-based diversity
program:
At the various diversity-training sessions, the company encouraged par-
ticipants to speak freely. Recalling a 1995 session, Hellen Harris, a 42-year-
old black production expediter in the financial-printing division, says she
told the 13-member group, including managers, "how hard it was to work in
a place that was so abusive to women and minorities."
But the managers disputed her observations, she says, adding: "It was
really draining and stressful." And she recalls that the division's director
"said he had a problem with blacks supervising whites."
Id.
34 See Elizabeth Sheley, Rlexible Work Options: Beyond 9 to 5, HR MAG., Feb. 1996, at
56, available in 1996 WL 9969423.
35 Michael H. LeRoy, Can TEAM Work? Implications of an Electromation and Du-
Pont Compliance Analysis for the TEAM Act, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 215 (1996).
36 The Teamwork For Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act of 1997: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL
8218929.
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members was equally divided between volunteer placement and em-
ployer selection; (6) most teams acted on the basis of employee-man-
agement consensus; and (7) the most common form of team
evaluation was jointly performed by employees and managers.37
The research I present here is an extension of my first survey. I
revised my Electromation and DuPont compliance survey in light of the
growing (but still small) number of NLRB cases that made section
8(a) (2) rulings.38 These cases are reviewed in Parts II(B)-II(D) of
this Article. Part II(B) examines those decisions in which the Board
found that an employer unlawfully established a labor organization
and dominated it.39 The next part discusses cases where an employer
was charged with unlawful domination of an employee team or group,
but no violation was found. 40 This is followed by a part in which two
federal appeals court decisions are discussed and analyzed. 4'
My continuing research is also informed by the debate over the
TEAM Act. In Part III, I review the pertinent history of this bill in the
104th Congress,42 and briefly examine the 105th Congress' treatment
of this proposed legislation.43
Based on these emerging developments, I revised my initial team
survey. These changes are discussed in Part IV(A).44 I then adminis-
tered these surveys to seventy-eight teams in scattered locations
throughout the United States. My sampling method is described in
Part IV(B),45 which is followed by an examination of the main flaws in
this study's research methodology. Part IV(D) presents my research
findings.46 By way of overview, these numerous findings can be con-
densed to three main conclusions:
37 See LeRoy, supra note 35, at 244-51.
38 See Vic Koenig Chevrolet, 321 N.L.R.B. 1255 (1996); Aero Detroit, Inc., 321
N.L.R.B. 1101 (1996); Autodie Int'l, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 688 (1996); Simmons Indus-
tries, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 228 (1996); Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 53 (1995); Stoody
Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 18 (1995); Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1995); Webcor Packag-
ing, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1995); Reno Hilton Resorts Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. 1154
(1995); Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995); Magan Med.
Clinic, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1994); Gamey Morris, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 101 (1993);
Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 312 N.L.R.B. 582 (1993); Ryder Distribution Re-
sources, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 814 (1993); Waste Management of Utah, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B.
883 (1993); Research Fed. Credit Union, 310 N.L.R.B. 56 (1993).
39 See infra notes 63-197 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 198-224 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 225-38 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 239-54 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 255-61 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 262-69 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 272-77 and accompanying text.
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1. These teams, compared to those in my first compliance survey,
are much more likely to be found to be statutory labor organizations
under the NLRA because they deal with employers over a wider variety
of workplace issues, such as the scheduling of employees' work.47 The
significance of this finding is that, compared to teams in my first sur-
vey, a much greater percentage of these teams now appears to be sub-
ject to section 8(a) (2)'s prohibition against employer domination or
interference.
2. Employer domination of teams has changed little, if at all, com-
pared to the first survey.48 However, since a greater number of non-
union teams now appear to meet the definitional requirements of a
statutory labor organization under the NLRA, this means that a
greater number of teams, compared to the first survey, appear to have
section 8(a) (2) compliance problems.49 Although a general survey
such as this cannot make case specific fact-findings, like those in un-
fair labor practice (ULP) proceedings involving section 8(a) (2), this
second wave survey suggests that about half of these nonunion teams
do not comply with this provision.
Although these findings are discussed in greater detail, it must be
noted here that many could be brought into compliance fairly easily.
For example, some forms of employer-employee dealing in teams,
such as handling employees' scheduling or management selection of
employees to participate on teams, could be eliminated or modified.
Nothing in these findings supports some employers' claims that the
NLRB's current enforcement of section 8(a) (2) is so draconian that
nonunion teams must be disbanded to comply with the law.50
47 See Findings 3 and 5 infra Part IV(D).
48 Compare Finding 5 in LeRoy, supra note 35, at 249 (finding that employers ap-
pointed employees in 39.1% of surveyed teams; that employees volunteered to partici-
pate in the same percentage of teams; and peers selected employees in 21.7% of
teams) with Finding 7, infra Part IV(D) (showing that employers selected team mem-
bers in 50% of the surveyed teams; employees volunteered to participate in 41.0% of
teams; and employees were selected by peers in 35.9% of teams).
49 When a team does not meet the NLRA's definition of a labor organization,
employer domination is a moot issue. section 8(a) (2), the provision prohibiting such
conduct, expressly prohibits employer domination or interference with a labor organ-
ization. To illustrate, a team that handles only product quality matters is not a labor
organization, as interpreted by the NLRB in Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
Therefore, an employer may lawfully dominate it.
50 Some employers make this exaggerated argument apparently to whip up con-
cern about the harmful effects of section 8(a) (2):
Although there are a small number of court cases, the ripple effect from
those cases is pervasive in corporate America. Many, many corporate execu-
tives are confused about how to interpret the current law. They are aban-
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3. This Article also finds that current teams are not like company
unions, because they are small-cell groups and exhibit a significant
degree of power-sharing between employers and employees. 51 Thus,
it finds merit in the TEAM Act's policy prescription of permitting le-
gitimate employee involvement groups to operate outside the stric-
tures of section 8(a) (2), while continuing to subject sham employee
representation groups or company unions to this law.
This Article concludes by discussing the public policy implica-
tions of these findings. These findings reveal no evidence of company
unions, because the surveyed teams were very small, had governance
structures in which employees and management shared decision-mak-
ing in varying degrees, and therefore were quite different from the
large-scale forms of earlier company unions. Considering, however,
that recent Board cases show that some employers do establish illegiti-
mate teams that are essentially company unions, this Article concludes
that section 8(a) (2)'s prohibition against this sham organization
should remain in place. However, it also concludes that the TEAM
Act is a desirable amendment to this prohibition because it proposes
to shelter employer efforts to communicate and collaborate with em-
ployees in nonunion settings without diminishing the NLRA's protec-
tions against sham unions.
II. EMERGING TRENDS IN SEGTION 8(A) (2) CASE LAW
FOLLOWING ELECTRofA TiON[
A. Oveview
The NLRB rarely adjudicates section 8(a) (2) cases.52 Neverthe-
less, employers view this law's enforcement as a threat to their compet-
itiveness in a global economy.53 From December 1992, when the
doning employee involvement altogether or are crippling initiatives by
placing severe limitations on them.
The Teamwork For Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act of 1997: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1996), available in 1996 WL
7135535 (testimony of Richard Wellins).
51 See discussion infra Part V (Conclusions and Policy Implications), Point 2.
52 Sen. Edward Kennedy's research disclosed that "[since the National Labor
Relations Board decided the Electromation case in 1992, the Board has resolved only 16
cases-out of 54,919 cases considered-in which part of the remedy required dissolu-
tion of employee teams." The Teamwork ForEmployees and Managers (TEAM) Act of 1997:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong., (1997),
available in 1997 WL 70683 (testimony of Sen, Edward M. Kennedy).
53 A prominent management attorney and former NLRB Member, Charles Co-
hen, summarized this concern:
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NLRB issued Electromatio7, to June 1997, the Board ruled on a handful
of cases involving participatory programs. 54
Although the NLRB ruled against employers in most of these
cases, it is important to note that these employers did not appear to
have legitimate participatory teams. Instead, their "teams" were
started directly in response to union organizing drives to offer em-
ployees an alternative to a union 55 or during election campaigns to
decertify a union.56 This is not to suggest that all adverse actions
against employers under section 8 (a) (2) involve spurious forms of em-
ployee representation. Polaroid's long-standing and progressive form
of nonunion representation was disbanded after an administrative law
judge (A.LJ.) ruled against it.57 The point is that most NLRB rulings
The TEAM Act is necessary because the law written in 1935 is too restric-
tive for today's economy. In the past 60 years, we have moved from a domes-
tic economy to a global economy. This has put immense pressure on
America's companies and their employees to improve quality, productivity,
and efficiency in order to compete with companies in other countries.
These improvements have been achieved in many instances through em-
ployee participation committees-which facilitates employer-employee com-
munication and allows managers to tap into their most valuable resource;
their employees.
Unfortunately, the NLRA severely restricts those committees in the
United States. In our zealous effort to prohibit company unions, we have
created obstacles to common sense dealings between employees and
management.
The Teamwork For Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act of 1997: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL 60517
(testimony of Charles Cohen).
54 The Teamwork For Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act of 1997: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL
63032.
55 These are Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 312 N.L.R.B. 582 (1993) (discussed
infra notes 63-79); Aero Detroit, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1996) (discussed infra notes
80-89); Reno Hilton Resorts Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. 1154 (1995) (discussed infra notes
90-95); Magan Med. Clinic, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1994) (discussed infra notes
96-102); Garney Morris, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 101 (1993) (discussed infra notes 103-10);
Ryder Distribution Resources, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 814 (1993) (discussed infra notes
111-21); Research Fed. Credit Union, 310 N.L.R.B. 56 (1993) (discussed infra notes
122-33); and Waste Management of Utah, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 883 (1993) (discussed
infra notes 134-42).
56 These are Vic Koenig Chevrolet, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1255 (1996) (discussed in-
fra notes 143-51) and Autodie Int'l, 321 N.L.R.B. 688 (1996) (discussed infra notes
152-65).
57 SeeAnn G. Liebowitz, The Non-Union Union?, 50 PRoc. OF NEw YORK UNIVERSrIY
FiT=a ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Samuel Estreicher, ed., forthcoming De-
cember 1997) (describing in detail Polaroid's Employees' Committee). Non-supervi-
sory employees and managers elected employees to a committee that, in addition to
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following Electromation have been set in high-pitched union-avoidance
campaigns and have not involved high-performance teams.
In two cases, however, the NLRB has upheld an employee partici-
pation program in the face of section 8(a) (2) charges.58 These cases
matter because they signal the Board's increasing toleration of em-
ployer experimentation with teams, particularly if those teams involve
legitimate efforts to improve workplace democracy.59 A related case
involved a challenge of employer communication to team members
represented by a union.60 The issue was whether an employer's ef-
forts to challenge a union's claim that team-member participation
would eventually lead to job cuts violated employees' section 8 (a) (1)
right to be free from employer interference, restraint, or coercion of
employees' exercise of their collective bargaining rights.61 The Board
its considerable autonomy, had wide-ranging powers to deal with management on
issues such as overtime, scheduling, and discipline.
58 These are Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 53 (1995) (discussed infra notes
198-203) and Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 18 (1995) (discussed infra notes 204-17).
59 Shortly after participating in these decisions, NLRB Chairman William Gould
IV said in a 1996 speech:
In a nonunion situation, the sensible response . . . is to allow employee
groups, with or without a management representative component, to discuss
anything they want. The more workers know about the enterprise and the
better they are able to participate in decision making, the more likely that
democratic values and competitiveness are enhanced. And if the law is sim-
plified, ordinary workers and small business people will be able to adapt to
their own circumstances and avoid reliance upon wasteful, expensive
litigation.
Remarks of NLRB Chairman Gould on Workplace Cooperation, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No.
208, at E-3 (Oct. 25, 1996).
60 Hamilton Standard Div. of United Technologies Corp., 313 N.L.R.B. 1303
(1994), also available in 1994 WL 228596.
61 In 1990, employees were reorganized into Continuous Improvement Teams
(CITs), and for the next two years, the union, which had a long bargaining relation-
ship with the employer, challenged the existence of these teams. InJanuary 1992, the
company president communicated a letter to all bargaining unit employees in which
he mentioned the union's earlier ULP complaint alleging that the company was pro-
moting CITs as an alternative to union representation. He stated:
Many employees have expressed concern about the future of continu-
ous improvement and team work at Hamilton Standard because of the
union's stance. Many of you feel the latest charge is an attempt to block
your efforts to help improve our business. If it is, I am confident the attempt
will not work.
We will go forward with continuous improvement at Hamilton Stan-
dard. I have seen the success of our core work teams and process improve-
ment teams, which are legal within the definition of the National Labor
Relations Act....
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ruled that the employer's answer to union claims did not chill this
right and was therefore lawful. 62 Although this is a section 8(a) (1)
case, it has obvious and direct implications for the administration of
teams under section 8(a) (2).
B. Post-Electromation Cases Finding Section 8(a)(2) Violations
In the wake of Electromation, several NLRB cases presenting sec-
tion 8(a) (2) violations stand out because they involved the establish-
ment of committees to thwart union organizing. Peninsula General
Hospital Medical Centet63 is the most important of these cases because
the NLRB's finding of a section 8(a) (2) violation was reversed on
appeal.64
A hospital employer established the Nurses Service Organization
(NSO) as early as 1968 to promote professional and social concerns. 65
Until 1988, the NSO did not handle employment matters.66 Employ-
ees funded the organization until 1988, when the hospital took over
this responsibility.67 In 1989, the NSO's executive committee recom-
mended changes to increase employee participation and organiza-
tional effectiveness, such as designating a representative from each
department to attend meetings.68
Implementation of these suggestions was put off until early 1990.
However, before this occurred, the Maryland Nurses Association be-
gan an organizing drive.69 At this time, some nurses staged ajob ac-
We will continue to promote values that empower people and en-
courage the success and survival of our company. But this charge could slow
our progress. It could delay needed improvements and end up costing us
business and jobs .... I assure you that, while we will abide by the decision
of the Board on this issue, we will, with your help, pursue our case and de-
fend our right to improve our business aggressively ....
Id. at 1304, 1994 WL 228596, at *3.
62 Id. at 1306, 1994 WL 228596, at *6. After noting that the letter was sent in a
context totally devoid of antiunion animus and other alleged ULPs, the Board found
that the company intended "to persuade its employees of the importance of the use of
continuous improvement teams." Id. at 1305, 1994 WL 228596 at *4. Moreover, the
Board found that the letter was devoid of any threats, express or implied. Id. at 1305,
1994 WL 228596, at *5.
63 312 N.L.RB. 582 (1993), available in 1993 WL 391258.
64 See NLRB v. Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 36 F.3d 1262 (4th Cir. 1994),
discussed infra notes 226, 229-38 and accompanying text.
65 Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Cr., 312 N.L.R.B. at 583, 1993 WL 391258, at *2.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 583, 1993 WL 391258, at *3.
69 Id. at 584, 1993 WL 391258, at *3.
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tion to protest wages, working conditions, and staffing. 70 One week
later, the NSO held a meeting to discuss these and other issues. 71 As
employee frustration became more apparent to the NSO's lead of-
ficer, Karen Poisker, she distributed a letter on February 26 stating
her sympathy for nurses' concerns and relating how the NSO would
respond.72 Her letter also informed nurses that the hospital adminis-
tration would soon conduct a benefits survey.73 Less than two months
later, the Association failed to receive a majority of votes in a represen-
tation election.74
The Association appealed this loss,75 and in the resulting A.LJ.
decision, the NSO was found to be a section 2(5) labor organization
that dealt with employees. 76 The A.LJ. also ruled that the hospital
unlawfully dominated the group.77
In affirming these rulings, the Board concluded that the NSO was
changed in 1989 to take on a representational character, and there-
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 584, 1993 WL 391258, at *4. In her letter, Poisker stated that NSO would
do more "decision making," meaning that NSO would be utilized more "'as a means
for active problem solving and decision making regarding nursing department poli-
cies, practice issues and projects (for example career paths, shared governance,
clinical ladder, budget process)."' Id. The letter also assured nurses that with "'the
support of all and participation of dedicated representatives from each area, we will
have a means to affect change and involve staff in decision making.'" Id.
73 Id. (stating that consultants had been hired to examine "'our entire compensa-
tion package including benefits'" and also informing the nurses that "' [p] ersonnel is
also planning a benefits survey so that they will be sure to know what the priorities
should be for consideration in this next budget year'").
74 Id.
75 Id. at *1-2.
76 Id. at 587, 1993 WL 391258, at *9 ("[T]here can be little doubt that the NSO,
whatever its origins may have been, clearly became an organization dealing with the
Employer concerning working conditions within the meaning of section 2(5) of the
Act.").
77 Id His analysis focused on Poisker's central role in restructuring and adminis-
tering the NSO. He noted that she was Vice-President for Nursing and a member of
the Hospital Executive Staff which was responsible for funding the hospital; that at
the same time she was active in the reorganization of the NSO; that she was an active
participant in effecting changes in the NSO, that she was also a member of the NSO's
Executive Committee and took part in establishing its meeting agendas, that she also
helped to rewrite the NSO's bylaws, which were later approved by the hospital's board
of trustees; and that she was also involved in discussing, responding to, and resolving a
whole array of work-related issues, including overtime scheduling, vacation, wages,
shift differential and sick leave. Id. He therefore concluded "Poisker was not only a
compelling active vocal force within the NSO, but was in fact the dominant force in
restructuring the NSO as a labor organization. Such activity constitutes domination
and interference in the affairs of the NSO." Id. at 587, 1993 WL 391258, at *10.
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fore engaged in bilateral dealings with employees that subjected it to
section 2(5).78 The Board also reasoned that since the hospital "dic-
tated the structure of the committee and controlled its operations, the
employees could reasonably view the committee as a substitute for col-
lective bargaining through traditional union representation, and the
employees were never given assurances of their right to choose collec-
tive bargaining through traditional union representation." 79
In Aero Detroit, Inc.,80 the employer appeared to implement a com-
pany union. It innocously named this employee organization the
Continuous Improvement Team (CIT),81 but unlike many teams, the
CIT was established during a union organizing drive.82 When the
plant manager formed the CIT, he told employees that this team was
better than a union for communicating their concerns to
management.83
The NLRB found that the company's "unlawful establishment of
the CIT, and its use of that entity as a vehicle for unlawfully soliciting
[employee] grievances and promising benefits to employees, in partic-
ular, struck at the very heart of the employees' organizational ef-
forts."8 4 It therefore concluded that the CIT was a section 2(5) labor
organization that dealt with employees over conditions of employ-
ment and served a representational function.85
One interesting aspect is that employees initially showed interest
in participating, but later backed away.86 The representation election
was inconclusive, with 79 votes for the organizing union, 75 votes
against this representative, and 14 votes challenged.8 7 A second elec-
tion was not ordered because the A.LJ. and Board believed that the
employer committed so many serious unfair labor practices that a fair
election could not be held.88 The Board therefore affirmed the
A.LJ.'s bargaining order.8 9
The Board also found a section 8(a) (2) violation in Reno Hilton
Resorts Corp.90 The hotel established Quality Action Teams (QATs) in
78 Id at 582 n.4, 1993 WL 391258, at *1 n.4.
79 Id.
80 321 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1996), available in 1996 WL 506084.
81 Id. at 1105, 1996 WL 506084, at *6.
82 Id. at 1109, 1996 WL 506084, at *9.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1105, 1996 WL 506084, at *6.
85 Id. at 1101, 1996 WL 506084, at *1.
86 Id. at 1109, 1996 WL 506084, at *9.
87 Id. at 1101 n.4, 1996 WL 506084, at *1 n.4.
88 Id. at 1105-06, 1996 WL 506084, at *6.
89 Id.
90 319 N.L.1.B. 1154 (1995), available in 1995 WL 788577.
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which employees dealt with the hotel over wages, hours, conditions of
work, safety, employee job rotations, starting times, and tip-sharing. 91
Employer domination of this organization occurred, according to the
Board, when the hotel's general manager set the agendas for each
meeting, paid employees to attend, and also, when he set the size and
structure of the QATs. 92
As in Aero Detroit, Inc., the employer set up a participatory commit-
tee in the midst of a union organizing campaign. 93 The union lost the
first election and later lost a rerun election; but the Board ruled that
the second election was "free and fair" and therefore declined to or-
der another election.94 Nevertheless, the Board ordered the hotel to
disestablish the QATs.95
In Magan Medical Clinic, Inc.,96 the employer set up a grievance
committee in which employees participated by voting for committee
members. 97 The committee's purpose was to provide a procedure for
airing employee grievances over wages, hours, and terms and condi-
tions of employment.98 The A.L.J. determined that management es-
tablished the committee immediately after learning that employees
were attempting to organize a union because they wanted a means to
adjust grievances against their supervisors.99
The A.L.J. concluded that the committee was a section 2(5) labor
organization that dealt with employees over statutory subjects, but also
found insufficient evidence that the employer dominated the commit-
tee. 00 Nevertheless, the A.L.J. ordered the employer to stop recogniz-
ing the committee. 10 The Board affirmed this order.'0 2
In Gamey Morris, Inc.,10 the company president formed an em-
ployee committee in response to a union organizing drive.1 04 He also
repeatedly prodded employees to select representatives to participate
on the committee.10 5 The A.L.J. concluded that "[i]t is hard to imag-
91 Id. at 1156-57, 1995 WL 788577, at *4.
92 Id. at 1157, 1995 WL 788577, at *4.
93 Id. at 1165, 1995 WL 788577, at *15-18.
94 Id. at 1157, 1995 WL 788577, at *5.
95 Id. at 1159, 1995 WL 788577, at *6.
96 314 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1994).
97 Id. at 1084.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1086.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1087.
102 Id. at 1083.
103 313 N.L.R.B. 101 (1993), available in 1993 WL 491808.
104 Id. at 101-02, 1993 WL 491808, at *1.
105 Id. at 116, 1993 WL 491808, at *27.
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ine any conduct on the part of an employer which could more thor-
oughly decimate an organizing drive and more surely render a Board
election meaningless." 06 He then imposed a bargaining order, which
the Board upheld on appeal. l07
In reaching this decision, the Board noted that in. direct response
to a union organizing campaign, the company systematically em-
barked on a widespread campaign designed to discourage union sup-
port.108 It ruled that the company committed "a large number and
variety of unfair labor practices affecting a large number of employ-
ees, including repeated 'hallmark' violations such as widespread
threats of plant closure and job loss, and actual, unlawful layoffs and
discharges of union supporters." 10 9 It also ordered the company to
disband and withdraw recognition from the representational
committee. 1 0
As in the preceding cases, management in Ryder Distribution Re-
sources, Inc."' formed an employee committee soon after a union or-
ganizing drive began."12 In this case, the company retained a
consultant, who advised the company to encourage employees to drop
their representation election petition in favor of participating in the
Quality Through People program (QTP)." 3 A representation elec-
tion was scheduled to be held on May 18, 1990, but following a May 6
request by employees, the Union withdrew its representation
petition. 114
Soon thereafter, the company tried to implement its QTP pro-
gram, but employees balked at participating. 115 After the company
offered $500 as a "good-faith gesture" to induce employees to partici-
pate, they agreed to do so. 1 6 It used the QTP program as a feeder to
five separate quality action committees, which dealt with the company
over safety, maintenance and repairs, communication, training, and
wages and benefits.1 7
106 Id. at 102, 1993 WL 491808, at *3.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 103, 1993 WL 491808, at *3.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 103, 1993 WL 491808, at *4.
111 311 N.L.RB. 814 (1993), available in 1993 WL 196063.
112 Id. at 814-15, 1993 WL 196063, at *1-2. The campaign began in February
1990, and the committee was formed in June.
113 Id. at 814, 1993 WL 196063, at *2.
114 Id. at 814-15, 1993 WL 196063, at *1.
115 Id. at 815, 1993 WL 196063, at *1.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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A conflict arose, however, when employees sought pay and bene-
fit increases through these committees, because management desired
that they merely suggest new ways to divide existing wages and bene-
fits. 118 The QTP program was then terminated and some employees
resumed a union organizing drive."19 The Board agreed with the
A.LJ. that the wages and benefits sub-committee was a section 2(5)
labor organization and was unlawfully dominated, 120 and ordered the
company to stop using this committee to deal with employees.' 2 '
In Research Federal Credit Union,'22 dissatisfied employees con-
tacted a union in early March 1990 to express their interest in organiz-
ing.' 23 According to the A.LJ., the company engaged a consultant "to
help [the company] wage an antiunion campaign and win the elec-
tion."' 24 After soliciting employee grievances through a series of in-
terviews, 125 the consultant helped form employee involvement teams
to discuss changes in sick leave, promotion, performance review, and
staffing policies.' 26
In finding that the committee structure constituted a section 2 (5)
labor organization which was unlawfully dominated, the A.LJ. rea-
soned that "it was created to undermine and supplant the Union as
the representative of Respondent's employees .... Its swift action in
soliciting grievances, then remedying or promising to remedy them
definitely got the attention of the employees and took the wind from
the sails of the union campaign.' 127 Believing that the employer's un-
lawful conduct "struck at the very heart of the employees' organiza-
tional efforts"' 28 and was "unlawfully established.., to facilitate direct
dealing with employees on working conditions, thus supplanting the
Union's role for the future,"129 the A.L.J. recommended a bargaining
order. He also ordered the employer to stop dealing with these com-
mittees and to disestablish them. 30
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 818, 1993 WL 196063, at *6.
121 Id. at 819, 1993 WL 196063, at *8.
122 310 N.L.R.B. 56 (1993), available in 1993 WL 7637.
123 Id. at 57, 1993 WL 7637, at *3.
124 Id. at 58, 1993 WL 7637, at *4.
125 Id. at 58-59, 1993 WL 7637, at *7.
126 Id. at 60-63, 1993 WL 7637, at *8-13.
127 Id. at 62, 1993 WL 7637, at *13.
128 Id. at 65, 1993 WL 7637, at *18.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 66-67, 1993 WL 7637, at *20.
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The Board affirmed these orders.13' In agreeing to this, Member
Raudabaugh restated the four factors he set forth in Electromation to
determine unlawful domination:
(1) the extent of the employer's involvement in the structure and
operation of the committee; (2) whether the employees, from an
objective standpoint, reasonably perceive the employee participa-
tion program as a substitute for full collective bargaining through a
traditional union; (3) whether employees have been assured of
their Sec. 7 right to choose to be represented by a traditional union
under a system of full collective bargaining;, and (4) the employer's
motives in establishing the employee participation program.'3 2
Applying these criteria, he found that the company completely dic-
tated the structure of the Employee Involvement Committee and con-
trolled its operations; that employees could reasonably view the
committee as a substitute for a union; that employees were not as--
sured of their right to choose collective bargaining through tradi-
tional union representation; and that the employer had antiunion
motives. 33
Waste Management of Utah, Inc.'34 involved a union organizing
drive that was spurred by management's reduction in benefits to im-
prove the firm's profitability.' 3 5 Within two months of the union's
filing for a representation election, the company instituted an em-
ployee involvement program that consisted of routing and productiv-
ity, safety, and benefits committees. 36 Management presided over
committee meetings, solicited employee participation, decided the
makeup of the committees, and chose meeting times and places. 37
Shortly before the representation election occurred, management
provided employees two documents of proposed policy changes in the
safety bonus program and accident/injury review program, and attrib-
uted these proposals to employee involvement committees. 38 Fur-
thermore, it promised to implement these proposals within a
month. 3 9
131 Id. at 56, 1993 WL 7637, at *1.
132 Id. at 56 n.1, 1993 WL 7637, at *1 n.1.
133 Id.
134 310 N.L.R.B. 883, available in 1992 WL 465255.
135 Id. at 886, 1992 WL 465255, at *7.
136 Id. at 890, 1992 WL 465255, at *14.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 890-91, 1992 WL 465255, at *15.
139 Id.
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Based on this evidence, the A.LJ. found that the employer cre-
ated a section 2(5) labor organization and unlawfully dominated it.14
He then ordered that the committees be disestablished and that the
employer bargain with the union. 41 The Board affirmed these or-
ders, noting that
While the subject matter of some of the committees, i.e., routing
and productivity, and safety, might under other circumstances indi-
cate that the avowed purposes of these committees might place
them outside the ambit of Section 8 (a) (2), it is plain that under our
recent decision in Electromation ... these committees were domi-
nated labor organizations tacitly held out to employees as an em-
ployer-approved alternative to representation by an organization of
the employees' own choice.' 42
Two section 8(a) (2) cases have coincided with employer efforts to de-
unionize by using the NLRA's de-certification process. In Vic Koenig
Chevrolet, Inc.,143 the company president circulated a petition for em-
ployees to express interest in decertifying their union. This occurred
after some bargaining unit employees expressed an interest in taking
this action.'4 Eventually, the president learned the identity of em-
ployees who supported this petition and those who did not. Shortly
thereafter, he created a four-employee group which, he said, would
give him "a fair spread" of opinions because the group included two
employees who had signed the petition and two who did not.145 After
convening this "Executive Committee," the president and these em-
ployees discussed a variety of issues, including changes in employee
pay and the attendance policy.'46
The A.LJ. found that the relationship between the committee
and company entailed a bilateral process which constitutes "dealing
with" under section 2(5) .147 She also concluded that a pattern or
practice of dealing had been established, even though only three
meetings occurred, because the committee had been in existence for
only four months before she heard the case (and therefore was meet-
ing with regularity in a short time), and because the company presi-
dent asked employees to develop more ideas about section 2(5)
140 Id. at 892, 1992 WL 465255, at *16.
141 Id. at 912, 1992 WL 465255, at *49-50.
142 Id. at 883, 1992 WL 465255, at *1.
143 321 N.L.R.B. 1255 (1996), available in 1996 WL 496374.
144 Id. at 1255, 1996 WL 496374, at *2.
145 Id. at 1282, 1996 WL 496374, at *42.
146 Id. at 1282-83, 1996 WL 496374, at *43.
147 Id. at 1284, 1996 WL 496374, at *45.
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subjects for future meetings.148 In addition, she concluded that the
committee acted in a representational capacity because its proposals
covered all employees and because the president asked the group to
consult with other employees about pay policy.' 49 Without specific
comment on the section 8(a) (2) issue, the Board affirmed the A.LJ.'s
ruling150 and ordered the company not to "dominate, assist, or other-
wise support the executive committee."' 51
Employees in Autodie Intemational Inc.,I 52 were represented for a
number of years by a labor organization called the Autodie Employees
Labor Organization (AELO). In December 1991, a majority of em-
ployees represented by the AELO voted to have their labor organiza-
tion affiliate with the United Auto Workers.153  When this
independent local affiliated with the UAW, Autodie Corporation rec-
ognized the new union. 54 A year later, the business sought bank-
ruptcy protection and was sold to a successor-employer, Autodie
International, Inc. (ADI).15 After this transaction, more than 200 of
ADI's 348 employees petitioned the company to negotiate with their
in-house committee instead of the UAW.' 56
The company then withdrew recognition from the UAW local
union. 57 Elections were held off company property for representa-
tives of the newly constituted Autodie International In-House Shop
Committee. 58 The company bargained collectively with elected rep-
resentatives of this group until the NLRB issued a ULP complaint. 5 9
Responding to this, the company withdrew recognition from the em-
ployee group and stopped bargaining. 60 Soon thereafter, however, a
group of employees formed the Autodie International Employees La-
bor Organization, whereupon the company recognized it, bargained
with it, and negotiated an agreement with it.161
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1255, 1996 WL 496374, at *1.
151 Id. at 1264, 1996 WL 496374, at *15.
152 321 N.L.R.B. 688 (1996), available in 1996 WL 392655.





158 Id. at 691, 1996 WL 392655, at *7.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 691-92, 1996 WL 392655, at *8.
161 Id.
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The A.L.J. concluded that the company violated section 8(a) (2)
by recognizing and bargaining with this employee group.' 62 In addi-
tion, he concluded that the company engaged in related unfair labor
practices when it switched work assignments based on employee sup-
port for the UAW, when it acted against employees who wore UAW
pins and hats, and when it denied the UAW access to company bulle-
tin boards. 163 He then ordered the company to stop recognizing and
dealing with this group.'6 The Board adopted his findings and af-
firmed his order with slight modifications. 165
The few remaining Board cases finding employer violations of
section 8(a) (2) are trendless. For example, the employer in Simmons
Industries, Inc.'6 6 established safety committees at two nonunion
plants. Their purpose was to communicate the company's safety pro-
gram to employees and to have employees identify safety risks.' 67 The
Board adopted the A.L.J.'s finding that the committees constituted
section 2(5) labor organizations because safety is included in the stat-
utory definition of working conditions.' 68 In particular, the A.L.J.
found that the "[s]afety [c]ommittee . . . [a] cted as representational
presenters of safety complaints and recommendation makers whose
proposals were considered and accepted or rejected by management
either at an interactive committee level or upon report from the
committee."169
In addition to these committees, the company formed a Total
Quality Management committee at both plants.' 70 The Board found
that these groups dealt with the employer over section 2(5) subjects
when they discussed bonus pay, length of work shift, absentee policy,
and break time.' 7 ' Since management selected employees to partici-
pate on the team, the Board also held that this arrangement violated
section 8(a) (2)'s prohibition against employer domination and inter-
ference with a labor organization. 172
The Board nevertheless found that one of Simmons' teams, the
Corrective Action Committee, did not violate the NLRA.' 73 Team
162 Id.
163 Id. at 692-94, 1996 WL 392655, at *9-11.
164 Id. at 696, 1996 WL 392655, at *16.
165 Id. at 688, 1996 WL 392655, at *1.
166 321 N.L.t.B. 228 (1996), available in 1996 WL 270959.
167 Id. at 249, 1996 WL 270959, at *41.
168 Id. at 228 n.3, 1996 WL 270959, at *3 n.3.
169 Id. at 254, 1996 WL 270959, at *50.
170 Id. at 231, 1996 WL 270959, at *6.
171 Id. at 253, 1996 WL 270959, at *50.
172 Id. at 228 n.3, 1996 WL 270959, at *3 n.3.
173 Id. at 254, 1996 WL 270959, at *50.
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members discussed various ways to process chicken for the company's
main customer, Kentucky Fried Chicken.1 7 4 The A.LJ. found that the
subjects discussed by the group were consistent with the guidance
principles set forth in Electromation and hence were not section 2(5)
subjects. 7 5 In particular, the judge concluded that the committee
"came within that area of informational mechanism which is limited
to questions of quality of product and efficiency of operation .... "1 7 6
By adopting the A.LJ.'s conclusions of law,'7 7 the Board agreed to
leave this committee alone.
The employer in WebcorPackaging, Inc.I18 was found to have estab-
lished a labor organization through a representative body named the
Plant Council. 7 9 The Board concluded that the Council was a statu-
tory labor organization because it involved a "bilateral mecha-
nism . . . [that] entails a pattern or practice in which a group of
employees, over time, makes proposals to management, and manage-
ment responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection by word
or deed."18 0 It also concluded that this organization was unlawfully
dominated because it was the "creation of management, whose struc-
174 Id. at 231, 1996 WL 270959, at *6.
175 Id. at 254, 1996 WL 270959, at *51.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 229, 1996 WL 270959, at *1.
178 319 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1995), available in 1995 WL 789965. The decision was af-
firmed while this Article was being edited. See NLRB v. Webcor Packaging, Inc., 118
F.3d 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). The court enforced the Board's order to disestablish the
Plant Council and held that it was without jurisdiction to overturn the Board's order
requiring that a new union representation election be held. Id. at 1125. Judge Guy's
concurrence is notable in light of this Article's view that Section 8(a) (2) requires
some modification:
Because I believe that the result reached in this case no longer reflects con-
gressional intent, it is with the greatest of reluctance that I concur. But for a
presidential veto of amendatory legislation passed by Congress, what Webcor
attempted to do here would be viewed against the backdrop of legislation
more hospitable to concepts like plant councils.
I& (concurring opinion).
179 The company's vice president testified that he ordered establishment of the
council. He said that it was designed to recommend and propose changes in working
conditions. Management would consider whether to accept or reject these
recommendations:
What you're looking for out of those bodies and specifically out of the Plant
Council, is a consensus building type of recommendation that would
come-that would be a recommendation from that entire committee to
Management about a proposed change ... and if there was a recommenda-
tion to be made, it was to be considered by Management.
Webcor Packaging, 319 N.L.R.B. at 1203, 1995 WL 789965, at *1.
180 Id.
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ture and function are essentially determined by management, and
whose continued existence depends on the fiat of manage-
ment .... "181
The company in Keeler Brass Automotive Group 82 established an
employee grievance committee in 1983, and revised its structure in
1991 so that no meeting could be called without management's ap-
proval. In this case, organizational changes were made in the absence
of any union organizing or presence.183 Soon after it was reconsti-
tuted, the employee committee recommended that management's de-
cision to discharge an employee be reduced to reinstatement with a
new seniority date. Management communicated its opposition to this
recommendation, and after more consideration, the committee re-
versed itself to let the discharge stand.'8 4 Soon thereafter, the com-
mittee took up another termination grievance and "tentatively"
decided that the grievant should be reinstated; but then reversed itself
after management submitted more evidence. 185
The A.LJ. ruled that the employee committee was not a section
2(5) labor organization, because the section's "dealing with" require-
ments were not met.186 In reversing this decision, the Board distin-
guished this case from two earlier cases involving disciplinary
committees that the Board ruled lawful because those employers fully
delegated adjudicatory functions to them.187
181 Id. at 1204, 1995 WL 789965, at *5. In summarizing this unlawful conduct the
Board quoted from a company memo that:
The Plant Council will consist of five hourly employees who will be elected
by the hourly work force,' and that 'the Plant Council will function as a
policy development body... involved with the development of plant poli-
cies, the employee handbooks, the creation of a grievance procedure that
will involve council member representation, and with the process of hourly
compensation and benefits.
Id. at 1204, 1995 WL 789965, at *5-6. The Board also noted that the company deter-
mined the number of management officials who would serve on the Council and then
selected management representatives. The Board also determined the council's func-
tion, subjects to be addressed, and the total number of employees and management
representatives to serve on the council. Id
182 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995), available in 1995 WL 421143.
183 Id. at 1112, 1995 WL 421143, at *3.
184 Id. at 1111, 1995 WL 421143, at *2.
185 Id. at 1111-12, 1995 WL 421143, at *3.
186 Id. at 1124, 1995 WL 421143, at *22.
187 See Mercy-Memorial Hospital, 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977), and John Ascuaga's
Nugget, 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977) (involving lawful grievance committees). In distin-
guishing Keeler Brass' committee, the Board noted:
Those employee committees could definitively resolve grievances without
further recourse to the employer. The Keeler Brass Grievance Committee,
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The Board also ruled that the employer unlawfully dominated
this committee. In reaching this judgment, the Board noted that the
grievance committee was formed in 1983 at the request of employees,
but when the committee was reconstituted in 1991, management
wrote its policies, defined its purpose, and determined its
composition. 188
In a concurring opinion that was noteworthy for endorsing genu-
inely empowered, nonunion disciplinary committees, Chairman
Gould said that "when employees freely participate in a committee
which, in itself, has the authority to resolve grievances and make final
decisions, ... the Committee is not a labor organization [under sec-
tion 2(5)]."189
In Dillon Stores,190 management established Associates' Commit-
tees in several stores. The company set forth the committees' govern-
ance structure in annual memos to full-time and part-time
employees.' 9 1 While they took up some matters unrelated to employ-
ment (for example, whether to provide service to customers who do
not wear a shirt or shoes), the committees also discussed matters such
in contrast, does not have full grievance handling authority without dealing
with management. This is reflected by Clinton's case. The Committee rec-
ommended conditional reinstatement. The recommendation was consid-
ered by IRD, but received a negative reaction followed by outright
rejection. The Committee then considered additional evidence from HRD
and reached a result that yielded to HRD. Similarly, in Podpolucki's case,
the Committee decided that reinstatement and backpay were warranted but
then changed course after ex parte discussion with management.
Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1114, 1995 WL 421143, at *6.
188 Id. "at 1114-15, 1995 WL 421143, at *7.
189 Id. at 1117, 1995 WL 421143, at *11.
190 319 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1995), available in 1995 WL 788570.
191 The memo stated:
TO ALL DILLON STORE RETAIL ASSOCIATES:
It is time to elect the Associates' Committee members for the 1993-94
year. As in the past, people serving on the committees will serve voluntarily.
Each store's committee will be comprised of one full-time associate and one
part-time associate. In towns where we have only one store, the committee
will be made up of two full-time associates and one part-time associate. We
encourage all departments to participate. The committee will meet once
each quarter, or as needed, to be determined by the committee and the
District Manager.
After the meeting with management personnel, a followup report of
items discussed and answers to questions covered by the committees will be
posted on each store's bulletin board. This report will also be discussed at
the next scheduled weekly store meeting.
Id. at 1246, 1995 WL 788570, at "3.
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as the company's dress-code for employees, criteria for promotion,
and employer plans to offer health benefits. 92
The A.LJ. found that "most, if not all, of the employee represent-
atives' proposals and grievances concerned the employees' terms and
conditions of employment; those proposals and grievances had been
advanced collectively on a representational basis; and [the company]
did entertain those proposals and grievances."1 93 He therefore con-
cluded that the company "engaged in 'dealing' with the Associates'
Committee. The Associates' Committee was, therefore, a labor organ-
ization under section 2(5)."194 He also found that the company un-
lawfully dominated each committee because:
[I]t initiated all meetings... ; it determined the committee's struc-
ture and functions;... it determined which employees would serve
as representatives [and] determined the terms of office of the rep-
resentative; it determined election dates and times; it provided elec-
tion notices, ballots, ballot boxes, and tally facilities [and]
procedures; and it paid employee representatives for their time
spent at meetings and preparing for meetings.' 95
The Board affirmed these findings, 96 and Chairman Gould specially
noted that the employer exerted too much control over the commit-
tee's governance structure and process. 197
C. Post-Electromation Cases Finding No Section 8(a)(2) Violations
Following Electromation, most section 8(a) (2) cases involving
teams have found that employers broke the law. Two cases, however,
found no employer violations.
Vons Grocery'98 involved a unionized employer who had formed
and met with a Quality Circle Group (QCG) in roundtable discussions
since 1983. Over time, nearly all the delivery drivers participated in
these discussions with management. 99 The Board found that its activ-
ities were consistent with guidance principles set forth in DuPont be-
192 Id. at 1246-47, 1995 WL 788570, at *4.
193 Id. at 1252, 1995 WL 788570, at *13.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 1245 nn.1-2, 1995 WL 788570, at *1 nn.1-2.
197 Id. at 1245 n.2, 1995 WL 788570, at *1 n.2 ("the control exercised by the [com-
pany] over the committee is such that the freedom of choice and independence of
action open to employees is too strictly confined within parameters of the [com-
pany's] making for the committee to be a genuine expression of democracy in the
workplace").
198 320 N.L.P.B. 53 (1995), available in 1995 WL 789954.
199 Id.
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cause discussions focused narrowly and consistently on operational
matters.200 On one occasion, however, the QGG strayed into new ter-
ritory by discussing a dress code and point system for accidents. 20 1
The Board viewed this as a de minimis violation that posed no threat to
the Union's traditional role in collective bargaining.20 2 It therefore
concluded that "[o]ne incident of making proposals on conditions of
work does not constitute a pattern or practice of dealing with the em-
ployer within the meaning of section 2 (5).1"203
Stoody Co.204 presents an interesting contrast to Research Federal
Credit Union and Ryder Distribution Center. Those cases involved section
8 (a) (2) violations resulting from employers acting on consultants' ad-
vice. 205 In contrast, Stoody Co. had no consultant; it relied on the
advice of its plant manager, who appeared to be cognizant of sections
2(5) and 8(a) (2) when he created an Employee Handbook Commit-
tee.20 6 While forming the committee in 1993, he clearly instructed it
not to make proposals with management concerning wages, benefits
and other working conditions.207 Instead, he said, its purpose was to
find out from employees what employment practices were inconsis-
tent with formal existing policies. 208 He also allowed the committee
to communicate to management its sense of policies that were obso-
lete or misunderstood by employees so that the company could re-
spond appropriately.20 9
Consistent with its guidance in DuPont, the Board found that
these communications did not constitute bilateral interaction between
employees and management, but instead were informational in na-
ture.210 In short, there was no "dealing with" between workers and
200 The Board reasoned that for "nearly 3 years, the QCG existed lawfully in the
Respondent's unionized work force as a group devoted to operational matters. Then,
on one and only one occasion, the QCG developed proposals on matters involving
conditions of work such as a dress code and an accident point policy." Id. at 54, 1995
WL 789954, at *2.
201 Id.
202 The Board noted that during this isolated instance "the Union was informed of
the proposals and brought into the consideration of them before any decision was
made. Indeed, the Union pursued the proposals in negotiating sessions with the Re-
spondent and the QCG gave up any further role with regard to the proposals." Id.
203 Id.
204 320 N.L.R.B. 18 (1995), available in 1995 WL 789953.
205 See Research Fed. Credit Union, 310 N.L.R.B. 56 (1993); Ryder Distribution
Center Resources, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 814 (1993).




210 Id. at 20, 1995 WL 789953, at *3.
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supervisors, and consequently, these discussions did not bring the
group within the statutory definition of a labor organization. 21' Thus,
the Board reversed the A.LJ.'s finding that the company violated sec-
tion 8(a) (2).212
The case also featured an isolated deviation by an employee
group from its standard practice. When an operations manager ap-
peared at one meeting, he led employees in a discussion about their
concerns over vacation time.213 This was a section 2(5) subject.214
The evidence showed, however, that the plant manager admonished
the operations manager for going beyond the well-defined scope of
the committee's charge, and the group never again discussed this
subject.215
The Board, recognizing on the one hand that Congress intended
that section 2 (5) be broadly construed, 21 6 nevertheless took a positive
view of employees and managers engaging in dialogue:
Drawing the line between a lawful employee participation program
and a statutory labor organization may not be a simple matter be-
cause it may be difficult to separate such issues as operations and
efficiency from those concerning the subjects listed in the statutory
definition of a labor organization. If parties are burdened with the
prospect that any deviation, however temporary, isolated, or unin-
tended, from the discussion of a certain subject, will change a lawful
employee participation committee into an unlawfully dominated la-
bor organization, they may reasonably be reluctant to engage in em-
ployee participation programs.217
Although neither case introduced a new legal doctrine, Vons Grocery
and Stoody Co. have several significant implications for teams. First,
enactment of the TEAM bill is far from certain during the 105th Con-
gress, particularly because during the first session, the Republican ma-
jority is far too small to override a likely presidential veto.218 Even
211 Id. at 20-21, 1995 WL 789953, at *4-5. The Board observed that the plant
manager "carefully limited the purpose of the Committee to information gathering.
He stated that the Committee was not to discuss wages, benefits, or working condi-
tions, but was to gather information about inconsistencies between the employee
handbook and actual practices." Id. at 21, 1995 WL 789953, at *5.
212 Id. at 19, 1995 WL 789953, at *2.




217 Id. at 20, 1995 WL 789953, at *4.
218 Republican efforts in June 1997 to attach a rider to a disaster relief bill to
flood-ravaged North Dakota provides a possible scenario for the TEAM Act, because
President Clinton threatened to veto both bills. Lack of enough members to override
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assuming that the political scene changes in the next few years, enact-
ment of this legislation will continue to be difficult because Democrats
may filibuster the bill in the Senate.2 19 This is exactly the tactic that
Republicans successfully used to block striker-replacement legislation
when they were a minority party in the early 1990s. 22 0
Consequently, in the foreseeable future the NLRB's interpreta-
tion of section 8(a) (2) is likely to determine the permissible limits of
employer dealings with nonunion teams under the NLRA. That being
so, in Vons Grocery the Board signaled unions and NLRB Regional Di-
rectors not to fuss over hyper-technical violations of section 8(a) (2).
In effect, this case created a doctrine permitting de minimis violations
of section 8(a) (2). One would predict, if the TEAM Act does not be-
come law, that employers will test this doctrine and attempt to expand
it. If, as in Vons Grocery, one mistaken use of teams is pardoned under
the law, what about two slips? What exactly constitutes a pattern or
practice of "dealing with" under section 2 (5)?
Also, employers might test Stoody Co.'s implicit principle of
agency. In effect, the Board implied that employer domination of a
labor organization cannot be attributed to any or all managers who
interact with a team when it examined the interplay between the oper-
ations manager and the plant manager.221 A test case might involve a
low-level manager who violates a carefully conceived and limited team
plan over a period of weeks, who is then stopped by senior manage-
ment from leading a team in this unlawful conduct after they learn
about this departure from the team's blueprint. Would the NLRB or-
der disbandment of a team under these circumstances? This is an-
other possible scenario for expanding Vons Grocery's de minimis
violation doctrine.
Stoody Co.'s most important implication draws from the fact that
management carefully considered Electromation compliance issues in
setting up a sophisticated nonunion employee committee. Although
employers predicted that Electromation w6uld terribly restrict their use
a veto forced congressional Republicans to withdraw their rider. See Sharon
Schmickle & Tom Hamburger, Clinton Returns Relief Bill to Congress With a Veto, STAR
TRm., June 10, 1997, at 1A, also available in 1997 WL 7569650.
219 When the Senate committee approved the TEAM Act in March, Sen. Kennedy
and other Democrats threatened to mount a filibuster to block a vote on the bill. See
Court Gifford, Senate Panel Approves TEAM Act; Democrats Warn of Foor Fight, Filibuster,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at AA-1 (March 6, 1997).
220 See Senate Vote to End Filibuster on Stiker Replacement Fails 53-47, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 133, at AA-1 (July 13, 1994).
221 See Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R.B. at 21, 1995 WL 789953, at *5.
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of teams,222 Stoody Co. leaves considerable latitude in organizing work
teams without violating the NLRA.2 23 One tactic is to limit subjects
that a team handles to quality, work process, and efficiency. Even if
the employer dominates this team, it is unlikely to be found in viola-
tion of the law because the NLRA has excluded these subjects from
the section 2(5) definition of a labor organization. On careful reflec-
tion, these safe havens are potentially expansive. A team working on
efficiency might consider, for example, whether a factory is too hot to
permit maximum work-flow. That is an efficiency issue, but it also
relates to work conditions. Or a team might establish a reward for
measurable improvements in efficiency, such as a raffle ticket for a
nice vacation. Has the team confined itself to efficiency, or has it
crossed the line into unlawful compensation? Prizes are both a re-
ward and an inducement, but they are not compensation, especially
when they are awarded on a lottery basis. Moreover, it is hard to see
DuPont's "bilateral interaction" implicated in such a plan. The point
is that Electromation leaves a fairly open field to employers who care-
fully direct teams toward efficiency and work process objectives and
apply this guidance decision creatively.
222 See, e.g., Arnold E. Perl, Employee Involvement Groups: The Outcry over the NLRB's
Electromation Decision, 44 LAB. L.J. 195 (1993); Michael Verespej, New Rules on Em-
ployee Involvemen4 Bus. WK., Feb. 1, 1993, at 55-58; Steven Weinstein, Teams In Trouble?
PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Feb. 1, 1993, at 93-95.
223 A web-page posting of advice byJohn E. Lyncheski, a Pittsburgh management
attorney with the law firm of Cohen & Grigsby, offers advice along these lines:
Minimize Support: An employer should limit the financial and other sup-
port provided to the committee. Participants should not receive any extra
pay or benefit for being on the committee.
Let the Committee Run the Committee: Employers should allow the com-
mittee to establish its own policies, procedures and guidelines. Employers
should also let the committee pick new members once original members no
longer take part.
Avoid Having Employees Act in a Representational Capacity: Debating or
bargaining over workplace issues with employees who act as representatives
for the workforce moves the dialog from communications and more toward
negotiations, and will likely result in an NLRB finding of illegality.
Break the Committee into Subcommittees: If separate subcommittees dis-
cuss different issues, employers won't have to drop the whole process just
because some aspect steps across the NLRB's line.
Stress the Group's Communication Role: An employer should emphasize
the communications aspects of the group.
John E. Lyncheski, Will the Rewards of Employee Participation Committees Outweigh the Risk
That The NLRB Finds Some Illegal? (visited Aug. 24, 1997) <http://www.stellar.org/
global/e-hr3.html>.
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Finally, these two cases are significant because, without them, it
would be hard to see where the Board's post-Electromation rulings have
drawn any line. Arguably, no line exists unless some decisions find
employer violations and others do not. These two cases indicate that
in the absence of legislation, the Board is incrementally expanding
earlier precedents that permit employers to deal with nonunion
teams. 224
D. Post-Electromation Appellate Cases Involving
Section 8(a)(2) Violations
Two appeals courts have reviewed the section 8(a) (2) cases since
the Board decided Electromation. One reviewed the Board's Electroma-
tion decision;2 25 the other reviewed Peninsula General Hospital Medical
Center.226 Both decisions carefully reviewed the legislative history of
section 8(a) (2) and its judicial interpretation.2 27 They also wrestled
with the fact that a 1935 law intended to outlaw rampant sham-union-
ism is now applied in a different economic and organizational-man-
agement context. 228 In both cases, a union organizing drive
coincided with an employer's attempt to implement new participatory
programs, and the Board ruled that the resulting employee organiza-
tions were unlawfully dominated section 2(5) labor organizations.
Why, then, did these courts reach conflicting rulings? The factual
differences were not great enough to warrant this. If anything, one
would reason that the Electromation court would reverse the Board's
ruling, because that employer disbanded its employee committees im-
mediately after learning that a union campaign was underway. Simi-
larly, one would expect that the Peninsula court would affirm the
224 Important precedents include John Ascuaga's Nugget, 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977),
available in 1977 WL 8927, and Mercy Memorial Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977), avail-
able in 1977 WL 9502, which involved total employer delegation of authority to em-
ployee groups to adjudicate disciplinary grievances and General Foods Corp., 231
N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977), available in 1977 WL 9495, where the Board upheld employer
creation of ajob enrichment program in which management delegated the functions
of investigating plant safety, job evaluation, and drafting ofjob descriptions.
225 Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
226 NLRB v. Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 36 F.3d 1262 (4th Cir. 1994).
227 The Electromation court reviewed this. See Electromation, 35 F.3d at 1163-68.
The Peninsula court reviewed this as well. See Peninsula, 36 F.3d at 1264-65, 1270-72.
228 The Electromation court acknowledged that "in an effort to succeed in an in-
creasingly competitive global marketplace, many United States companies have devel-
oped employee involvement structures which encourage employee participation .... "
Elearomation, 35 F.3d at 1156. In a similar vein, the Peninsula court stated "employee
participation programs have become a vital part of American industry... ." Peninsula,
36 F.3d at 1265 (citation omitted).
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Board's ruling because the hospital intensified its reorganizational ef-
forts after learning that the same kind of drive was occurring in its
workplace. What accounts for the difference is judicial temperament:
the Electromation court properly carried out a narrow review, while the
Peninsula court substituted its fact-finding for the Board's.
The Peninsula court said all the right things about its scope of
review for NLRB decisions. It noted that the "determination of
whether an employee organization is a 'labor organization' is a matter
within the Board's expertise, and therefore, lies in the first instance
with the Board."229 In a related vein, the NLRA requires federal courts
"to uphold the Board's factual findings if they are supported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record."230
The court lost sight of these limitations when it failed to defer to
the Board's fact-findings. The Board thought it relevant that the
NSO, which had existed since 1976, changed its purpose in 1989,
within months of a union organizing campaign;2 31 but the court saw
no connection in this timing when it concluded that "unrelated to the
NSO, the operating room nurses conducted their job action and, at
roughly the same time, the Association began an organizing campaign
at the hospital."232 When a management liaison for the NSO stated
that she saw a need for the NSO to "communicate" with nurses con-
cerning matters such as differential pay, the court seized on this verb
to conclude this interaction fell outside the bounds of bilateral inter-
action.233 In contrast, the Board viewed this "communication" as part
of a change in the NSO's purpose, moving it away from a professional
service organization to a representational form that was intended to
function as a union substitute. 234 The Board also viewed a survey that
was administered after the NSO was reorganized as evidence of bilat-
eral interaction, because many of the survey responses dealt with em-
ployment matters and because management intended to act on
them.235 The court, although lacking power to be a fact-finder, never-
theless negated the Board's reasonable inference when it stated, 'We
229 Peninsula, 36 F.3d at 1269 (quoting Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n v. In-
terlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173, 178-82 (1962)).
230 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e) and (f), and also citing Consolidated Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (holding that substantial evidence is more than a scin-
tilla but less than a preponderance)).
231 Id. at 1272.
232 Id. at 1272 n.13.
233 Id. at 1272.
234 Id. at 1273.
235 Id.
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find this [inference] to be purely speculative and directly contrary to
the undisputed evidence in the record."23 6
At the core of its rejection of the Board's fact-findings, the court
viewed management's change in the structure of the NSO, beginning
with a statement of intent to make such a change in late October
1989, as disconnected from the job-action and formal beginning of an
organizing drive that occurred less than three months later.23 7 The
Board, by contrast, was impressed by the fact that these organizational
changes and the association's organizing drive virtually overlapped; it
therefore concluded that hospital management overhauled the NSO
to stave off the possibility of bargaining with a union. The court trivi-
alized this change "as part of the budget process."238
III. THE REVISED TEAM AcT
A. The TEAM Act in the 104th Congress
As I noted in my 1996 Article, the 104th Congress first considered
a version of the TEAM Act that merely proposed to codify Electroma-
tion's guidance precepts. 239 The initial bill was ironic because it pro-
posed to codify an NLRB decision which employers and Republicans
vehemently protested.24° I therefore concluded that this bill was
partly an excerise in "demonstrating Republican prowess in legislating
against labor's will."241
Representative Steve Gunderson (R., Wis.) was the chief sponsor
of the first version of the TEAM Act.242 In all likelihood, he did not
offer this mild version out of philosophical preference, but rather, in
236 Id-
237 Id. (noting that "[b]ecause Peninsula had, as of October 23, implemented sev-
eral measures which were seemingly responsive to the nurses' concerns, the Board
argues that this shows that Peninsula responded to the NSO's proposals and, there-
fore, 'dealt with' the NSO," but disputing that any evidence in the record supported
this inference).
238 Id. at 1274.
239 See LeRoy, supra note 35, at 240 (concluding that "[o]n its face, then, the
TEAM Act is a very limited proposal to codify much of Electromation's and DuPont's
guidance language.").
240 See id. (observing that employers "responded with alarm to these principles"
when the Board first set them forth).
241 Id. at 262.
242 See Statement by Rep. Gunderson and Text of Teamwork for Employees and Managers
Act; Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at D-25 (Jan. 31, 1995) (reporting on Rep. Gun-
derson's introduction of the TEAM Act and reprinting the bill).
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anticipation of President Clinton's threatened veto of his bill.243 In
effect, he dared the President to reject a bill that codified an NLRB
decision that unions found desirable only a few years earlier. During
committee hearings, however, Gunderson's Republican colleagues ex-
pressed unease and sought more protections for nonunion.teams. 244
Shortly thereafter, the bill was amended along these lines.24 5
The House narrowly passed H.R. 743 on September 27, 1995.246
When the Senate version was on the floor for a vote, moderate Demo-
crats such as SenatorJeff Bingaman (D., N.M.) unsuccessfully tried to
find a legislative compromise that would make the bill veto-proof.247
These efforts failed and H.R. 743 passed by an even slimmer margin
on July 10, 1996.248 As he promised, President Clinton vetoed the
bill,249 and subsequent efforts to override his veto were fruitless. 250 In
243 The President threatened to veto this legislation in the early days of the 104th
Congress. See White House Offers Protection to Unions, CHARLFsTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 21,
1995, at ID, available in 1995 WL 11623583.
244 See Michelle Amber, AFL-CIO: Gore Says Clinton Would Veto Repeal ofDavis-Bacon,
Service Contract Acts, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, D-6 (Feb. 22, 1995) (reporting
that the House Chairman of the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportu-
nities suggested that Rep. Gunderson meet with business leaders to hear their con-
cerns about this legislation).
245 See Court Gifford, Employee Involvement: House Panel Clears TEAM Act; Reich
Threatens Veto by Clinton, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at D-4 (March 8, 1995) (re-
porting that a House subcommittee voted 8-4 to approve a substitute version of the
bill).
246 See Business Praises House TEAM Act Passage; Labor Notes Close Margin, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 189, D-7 (Sept. 29, 1995) (reporting passage of the bill on a 221-202
vote).
247 Summarizing the futility of this task, Sen. Bingaman spoke before the full Sen-
ate just prior to that chamber's vote on the TEAM Act:
[A]fter several weeks of trying to find this common ground to propose a
substitute for the bill that we are considering, I have concluded that it is not
possible at this time. The organization of employers that has been formed to
support the TEAM Act has determined to resist amendments and to drive
toward passage of S. 295 even though this legislation faces a sure veto by the
President. The labor unions, on the other hand, have organized to oppose
the TEAM Act. Relying on the President's promised veto, they have deter-
mined that the TEAM Act or any substitute for it which amends Section
8(a) (2) should be opposed.
142 CONG. REc. S7508-02 (daily ed. July 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bingaman),
available in 1996 WL 385048.
248 See TEAM Act Clears Senate, Clinton Veto Expected, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 133,
at D-2 (July 11, 1996) (reporting passage of the bill on a 53-46 vote).
249 See White House Office of Communications, Veto of Employees and Managers
TEAMWORK Act July 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL 425665. The President
explained:
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all likelihood, he vetoed the bill because unions strongly opposed it251
I am returning herewith without my approval, H.R. 743, the "Teamwork
for Employees and Managers Act of 1995." This act would undermine crucial
employee protections.
I strongly support workplace practices that promote cooperative labor-
management relations. In order for the United States to remain globally
competitive into the next century, employees must recognize their stake in
their employer's business, employers must value their employees' labor, and
each must work in partnership with each other. Cooperative efforts, by pro-
moting mutual trust and respect, can encourage innovation, improve pro-
ductivity, and enhance the efficiency and performance of American
workplaces.
Current law provides for a wide variety of cooperative workplace efforts.
It permits employers to work with employees in quality circles to improve
quality, efficiency, and productivity. Current law also allows employers to
delegate significant managerial responsibilities to employee work teams,
sponsor brainstorming sessions, and solicit employee suggestions and criti-
cisms. Today, 30,000 workplaces across the country have employee involve-
ment plans. According to one recent survey, 96% of large employers already
have established such programs.
I strongly support further labor-management cooperation within the
broad parameters allowed under current law. To the extent that recent Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decisions have created uncertainty as
to the scope of permissible cooperation, the NLRB, in the exercise of its
independent authority, should provide guidance to clarify the broad legal
boundaries of labor-management teamwork. The Congress rejected a more
narrowly defined proposal designed to accomplish that objective.
Instead, this legislation, rather than promoting genuine teamwork,
would undermine the system of collective bargaining that has served this
country so well for many decades. It would do this by allowing employers to
establish company unions where no union currently exists and permitting
company-dominated unions where employees are in the process of deter-
mining whether to be represented by a union. Rather than encouraging
true workplace cooperation, this bill would abolish protections that ensure
democratic representation in the workplace.
True cooperative efforts must be based on true partnerships. A context
of mutual trust and respect encourages the prospect for achieving workplace
innovation, improved productivity, and enhanced efficiency and workplace
performance. Any ambiguities in this situation should be resolved, but with-
out weakening or eliminating fundamental rights of employees to collective
bargaining.
Id.
250 See Kassebaum Hits Clinton's TEAM Act Veto as Election-Year Move to Placate Labor,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 148, at D-8 (Aug. 1, 1996) (reporting Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott's view that an override vote would be unlikely to occur).
251 An undated memorandum prepared by the national AFL-CIO explained the
labor federation's opposition to the bill. In sum, the memo argued that (1) "[t]he
TEAM Act will allow employers to resurrect company unions of the past," (2) "[t]he
TEAM Act will take away fundamental democratic rights that workers currently en-
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and contributed large sums of money to his re-election campaign.2 52
Moreover, in stump speeches leading up to the 1996 elections, the
administration stated its alliance with the AFL-CIO in opposing the
TEAM Act253 and thought the bill was important enough to include in
the Democratic Party platform.2 54
B. The TEAM Act in the 105th Congress
Having retained control of the Congress in the 1996 elections,
Republicans identified the TEAM Act as an important legislative prior-
ity.2 55 The bill was reintroduced early in the 105th Congress in the
form that the 104th Congress passed. 25 6 Reflecting the priority that
Republicans assigned it, the bill moved swiftly through the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Before a key committee
vote, a leading opponent, Senator Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.), of-
fered four amendments during the bill's mark-up.2 57 These would
have (1) prohibited employers from implementing employee involve-
joy," (3) "[c]arving out union-represented employers does not cure the fatal flaws of
S. 295," (4) " [t]he TEAM Act will tilt the careful balance of labor relations heavily in
favor of management," (5) "[the TEAM Act is unnecessary-current law does not
prohibit legitimate labor management cooperation." Undated and untitled legislative
memorandum prepared by Maria C. Fiordellisi, Legislative Representative, AFL-CIO
(copy on file with author).
252 Shortly before he vetoed the TEAM Act, the President received donations total-
ing $230,000 from the Laborers International Union, $100,000 from the American
Federation of Teachers, and $250,000 from the Communications Workers Union. See
Ruth Marcus & Charles R. Babcock, Parties' National Committees Set Record for 'Soft
Money,'WAsH. PosT, July 18, 1996, at A8.
253 See, e.g., Vice President Al Gore's Remarks to United Auto Workers Conven-
tion, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 7, 1995) (copy on file with author). In his remarks, the
Vice President stated that "[w]hen we see the Republicans urging modification of
section 8(a) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, we draw the line. We oppose
tampering with the prohibition against company dominated unions!"; Pamela M.
Prah, Clinton Seeks USWDelegates' Support in Getting Democrats Elected at All Levels, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 155, at D-5 (Aug. 12, 1996) (reporting that the President ad-
dressed the Steelworkers' convention via satellite, in part, to state his shared opposi-
tion to the TEAM Act).
254 See Pamela M. Prah, Union Rights, Job Training, Immigration Spotlighted in Draft
Democratic Platform, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 148, at D-10 (Aug. 1, 1996) (reporting
that a draft of the platform stated that "[w]e vigorously oppose the Republican ef-
forts.. . to undermine collective bargaining through the TEAM Act.").
255 See Comp Time, TEAM Act Rank Among Goodling's Top Priorities, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 227, at D-2 (Nov. 25, 1996).
256 See Fawell Introduces TEAM Act in House; Hearing Set on Companion Bill in Senat
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at D-1 1 (Feb. 10, 1997).
257 See Court Gifford, Senate Panel Rejects Kennedy Amendments, Will Resume Markup of
TEAM Act March 5, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at D-7 (March 3, 1997).
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ment committees during union organizing campaigns, (2) provided
employees triple back pay if they were fired during union organizing
campaigns, (3) required an employer to provide a union access to the
workplace if an employer conducted a captive audience meeting, and
(4) authorized the NLRB to seek injunctions to reinstate employees
who are discharged during union organizing campaigns. Senator
James Jeffords (R., Vt.), chair of the Senate Labor and Human Re-
sources Committee, urged his committee to defeat all four amend-
ments, and subsequently, these amendments were defeated on a 10-8
vote along party lines.2 8
A virtual repeat of the bill's previous experience is quite possible,
but there are indications that it may be enacted. One difference from
past experience is that a Democratic senator with a solid record for
voting in favor of AFL-CIO policy positions, Senator Bingaman (D.,
N.M.) has already voted with Republicans during a key committee
vote.25 9 The significance of his vote is two-fold. It increases the possi-
bility that moderate and conservative Democrats may cross party lines
to support this legislation. In addition, Senator Bingaman, who tried
unsuccessfully to broker a compromise in 1996, is now in a stronger
position to negotiate such a compromise with his Republican counter-
parts, because TEAM Act supporters are likely to see him as bridge for
winning more Democrats.
Another difference from past experience is that some Democrats
are threatening to filibuster the bill.260 This extreme measure, a tactic
that empowers a minority of senators, implies that the bill has a
stronger prospect of enactment. A bill that had less chance of com-
promise and eventual passage probably would not elicit this extreme
response.
The National Association of Manufacturers' moderate tone adds
another difference. This influential lobby group for employers ex-
pressed optimism that a legislative compromise would be worked out
to avert a presidential veto.26 1
258 See id.
259 See Court Gifford, Senate Panel Approves TFAM Act, Democrats Warn of Floor Fight,
Filibuster, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at D-7 (March 6, 1997).
260 See id. (indicating that Sen. Kennedy and other Democrats on the labor com-
mittee are prepared to filibuster the bill and otherwise mount a floor fight once it
reaches the floor for a vote).
261 See NAM Offers Agenda for Helping Workers that Stresses Worker Involvement of
TEAM, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at A-5 (Feb. 27, 1997) (reporting NAM presi-
dentJerryJasinowski's view that a compromise could be brokered and a repeat veto of
the TEAM Act avoided).
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Table 1
Comparison of TEAM Act Language, 104th and 105th Congress
(Differences in Italics)
10-II, CONGRESS
INITIAL VERSION OF H.R. 743
[INTRODUCEDJAN. 30, 1995]
SECTION 8(A) (2) SHALL BE AMENDED
TO ADD:
Provided further, That it shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice for any employer to
establish, assist, maintain,or participate
in any organization or entity of any
kind, in which employees participate, to
address matters of mutual interest,
including issues of quality, productivity
and efficiency, and which does not have,
claim or seek authority to enter into
collective bargaining agreements with
the employer or to amend existing
collective bargaining agreements
between the employer and any labor
organization.
[AMENDED AS STATED IN ADJOINING
COLUMN AND PASSED BY HOUSE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MARCH 7, 1997]
.105THf CONGRESS
REVISED VERSION OF H.R. 743
[INTRODUCED FEB. 3, 1997]
SECTION 8 (A) (2) SHALL BE AMENDED
TO ADD:
Provided further, That it shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice for an employer to
establish, assist, maintain, or participate
in any organization or entity of any
kind, in which employees participate to
at least the same extent practicable as
representatives of management participate, to
address matters of mutual interest,
including, but not limited to, issues of
quality, productivity, efficiency, and
safety and health, and which does not
have, claim, or seek authority to be the
exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees or to enter into collective
bargaining agreements between the
employer and any labor organization,
except that in a case in which a labor
organization is the representative of such
employees as provided in section 9(a), this
proviso shall not apply.
IV. FINDINGS OF EMPLOYER "DEALING WITH" AND DOMINATION OF
EMPLOYEE TEAMs
A. Revised Research Questions in Wave 2 of the Team Survey
Wave 2 of this survey mostly replicated my first Electromation com-
pliance survey.262 I made some changes, however, to reflect new
NLRB case law. I expanded the list of workplace subjects teams han-
dle to include four additional subjects. Management of diversity was
added because more teams are being asked to perform this func-
tion.2 63 Team handling of employee handbooks was added in light of
the experience disclosed in Stoody Co.264 Grievances were added be-
262 See LeRoy, supra note 35, at 262-66.
263 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
264 See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
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cause the team in Keeler Brass Automotive Group dealt with this sub-
ject. 26 5 Scheduling was added because this seemingly mundane issue
triggered recent labor disputes,266 was raised in the form of a pro-
posed legislative amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 267 and
was included in the section 2(5) listing of subjects handled by a labor
organization.268
I also tried to measure more clearly the degree to which employ-
ees and managers directed team activities. Thus, I expanded Item
111(4) in my first survey, which simply asked respondents to answer
whether the group's work was determined by management directive,
management-employee consensus, or employee initiative. In the sec-
ond wave, Item 1(4) asked, "Who directs the team's or group's activi-
ties? Check more than one if applicable." I then created separate
sections for respondents to assess the extent to which management,
employees, and management and employees jointly direct these activi-
ties. I made this revision because my original question forced respon-
dents to choose among three categorical responses without weighing
relative degrees of control within these responses. I also probed more
deeply into whether teams experienced disagreements and, if so, how
these were resolved. Keeler Brass Automotive Group, involving an em-
ployer who disagreed with its grievance committee's decisions,
prompted this new line of questioning.269
B. Sampling Method
Senior HR managers who attended a Labor Policy Association
(LPA) conference were asked to participate in this survey. As a result,
teams at six Fortune 500 companies were surveyed between April and
July 1997. Neither the LPA nor any participating employer revised,
restated, deleted, or otherwise modified any survey item that was
265 See supra notes i82-87 and accompanying text.
266 Two large employers, Staley and Dial Corp., locked out employees after their
workers refused to agree to concessions to eliminate eight-hour work shifts that were
consistently scheduled during the day or night. See 57% of Staley Union Workers Reject
Contract, PFoRAJ. STAR, July 11, 1995, at C7, available in 1995 WL 3247702; and Don-
ald E. Franklin, DialLocks Out 386 Workers at LocalPlant ST. Louis POST-DISPATCHJuly
2, 1993, at 7A, available in 1993 WL 8028006.
267 See Court Gifford, White House Draws Line on Comp Time; Won't Negotiate with
GOP over flextime, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 110, at D-18 (June 9, 1997) (reporting
on the Family Friendly Workplace Act, S. 4, 105th Cong. (1997), a Republican bill to
amend the FLSA by substituting compensatory time off for mandatory time-and-a-half
overtime pay).
268 The definition of subjects handled by a section 2(5) labor organization in-
cludes "hours of employment." See supra note 10.
269 See supra notes 183-84.
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presented at its March meeting. In addition, neither the LPA nor any
employer funded this research.
These senior-level officers were asked to identify one or more
nonunion locations with employee teams. Surveys were then provided
for each specific team at a given location. 270 Respondents could be
either a manager or a non-supervisory employee. A survey item asked
about their supervisory status. 271 The first page of the survey was on
University of Illinois stationery, with my phone number and address
clearly printed. Respondents were instructed to answer the survey
truthfully and completely, and to mail the survey directly to me or to
place the survey in a sealed envelope and return it to a central collec-
tion point for the participating firm. All participating firms were ex-
pressly told that a survey delivered to me with a broken seal would not
be counted.
C. Methodology Flaws
The survey used in this study provides a starting point for a study
that would produce generalizable results. A better survey, however,
would sample many hundreds of nonunion teams among large and
small employers over more diverse industries. It would also improve
on the questions in this survey by asking for more specific informa-
tion. For example, it would probe more deeply into the answers re-
vealing that team participation improved employer-employee
communication and also improved employee pay. Specifically, it
would ask whether improved employer-employee communication less-
ened the appeal of a union for team members, and whether improved
pay resulted from a gainsharing policy that the employer imple-
mented outside of the team's decision-making framework. An im-
proved survey would also be longitudinal; that is, it would track the
same teams over time and would periodically survey them to deter-
mine whether and how they evolve. A sophisticated analysis of many
teams would also contemplate that some would be affected by union
organizing campaigns, and would analyze campaign outcomes in light
of team characteristics.
270 The sample drew from worksites in six states: Oklahoma, Utah, Illinois, Colo-
rado, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
271 Managers completed 67% of surveys; non-supervisory employees completed
33%.
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Figure IA
Are Teams Section 2(5) Labor Organizations?
Characteristics of 78 Nonunion Work Teams
Inquiry Compliance Fuzzy Compliance Non-Compliance
"Dealing with" 1 (1.3%) 37 (47.4%)*
employees: How does Discuss without Make proposal that
team interact with deciding/ mgmt. considers
management? suggesting 16 (20.5%)*
24 (30.8%) Team reaches
Offer suggestions decisions by voting
35 (44.9%) 37 (47.4%)*
Interact with Team reaches
customers decisions by
informal consensus
What subjects does 64 (82.1%) 12 (15.4%) 13 (16.7%)
the team handle? Work process Other Discipline






















* Note: 85% of the teams had managers participate with
interactions.
employees in these
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Figure 1B
Section 8(a) (2): Do Employers Dominate Teams?
Inquiry Compliance Fuzzy Compliance Non-Compliance
Who created the 2 (2.6%) 38 (47.7%) 38 (47.7%)
team? Employees Mgmt. and Management
employees
Who selects Non- 32 (41.0%) 39 (50.0%)
supervisory employees Volunteer Managers
to teams? 28 (35.9%) 30 (39.0%)
Peers Part ofjob
W directs team? 12 (15.8%) 25 (32.9%) 6 (7.9%)
Mgmt. rarely Mgmt. occasionally Mgmt. always
directs directs directs
5 (6.6%) 36 (46.8%) 28 (36.8%)
Mgmt. never Employees Mgmt. usually
directs occasionally direct directs
6 (7.8%) 5 (6.6%)
Employees always Mgmt. vetoes
direct actions
29 (37.7%) 4 (5.2%)
Employees usually Employees rarely
direct direct
2 (2.6%) 3 (3.9%)
Employees veto Employees never
actions direct
D. Research Findings
Figures IA and lB summarize my data analysis. It is important to
understand that survey items permitted respondents to check more
than one answer, where applicable. To illustrate, some teams interact
in several different ways by discussing some matters without making a
proposal to management, by reaching decisions on other issues, and
by presenting formal proposals to management. Thus, percentage
totals in Figures IA and lB do not sum to 100%.
Finding 1: Most of the surveyed teams are small.
The average team had nine members.272 Almost two-thirds
(62.8%) of the surveyed teams had ten or fewer members. An addi-
tional 25.7% of the surveyed teams had eleven to twenty members.
Thus, 88.5% of the surveyed teams have twenty or fewer members.
272 The median is used here.
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Compared to teams in my first survey, a much greater percentage of
teams in this survey are smaller.
2 73
Finding 2: Most of the teams came into existence in the past four
years, after the Board rendered its Electromation decision.
Fifty-three of the teams (67.9%) have been in existence four years
or less. Seventeen teams (21.8%) have been in existence one year or
less, and nineteen teams (24.4%) have been in existence two years.
Finding 3: Roughly half the teams appear to have bilateral
interactions with management that are in a fuzzy compliance
zone regarding the section 2(5) "dealing with" test.
My analysis for this finding began by examining how many teams
are composed of managers and non-supervisory employees. Eighty-
five percent of the teams have this composition. The Board consid-
ered this matter as an important factor in determining whether the
employer in DuPont was "dealing with" employee teams:
All the committees discussed proposals with management represent-
atives inside the committees. Each committee has management
representatives who are full participating members. These repre-
sentatives interact with employee committee-members under the
rules of consensus decision-making as defined in the Respondent's
Personal Effectiveness Process handbook. The handbook states:
"consensus is reached when all members of the group, including its
leader, are willing to accept a decision." Under this style of opera-
tion, the management members of the committees discuss propos-
als with unit employee members and have the power to reject any
proposal. Clearly, if management members outside the committee
had that power, there would be "dealing" between the employee
committee and management.2 74
However, the Board did not believe that a team's composition
necessarily indicated section 2 (5) "dealing with":
In our view, the fact that the management persons are on the com-
mittee is only a difference of form; it is not a difference of sub-
stance. As a practical matter, if management representatives can
reject employee proposals, it makes no real difference whether they
do so from inside or outside the committee. In circumstances
where management members of the committee discuss proposals
273 Compare LeRoy, supra note 35, at 244, Finding 1 (reporting that only six of
twenty-two (27.8%) teams had fewer than ten members, and an additional five teams
(22.7%) had ten to nineteen members).
274 E.I. DuPont & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 895 (1993), available in 1993 WL 191471.
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with employee members and have the power to reject any proposal,
we find that there is "dealing" within the meaning of Section
2 (5) .275
On the other hand, the Board noted:
The mere presence, however, of management members on a com-
mittee would not necessarily result in a finding that the committee
deals with the employer within the meaning of Section 2(5). For
example, there would be no "dealing with" management if the com-
mittee were governed by majority decision-making, management
representatives were in the minority, and the committee had the
power to decide matters for itself, rather than simply make propos-
als to management. Similarly, there would be no "dealing" if man-
agement representatives participated on the committee as observers
or facilitators without the right to vote on committee proposals.276
In view of this doctrinal vagueness, I categorized responses indi-
cating that teams make proposals or make decisions by taking votes or
reaching consensus in the fuzzy compliance category. As the forego-
ing discussion indicates, however, there are circumstances where in-
tra-team actions such as voting, forming consensus, and making
proposals can constitute statutory "dealing with" (that is, where deal-
ing with occurs as a function of non-supervisory employees and man-
agement representatives engaged in bilateral exchanges within a team
setting).
In light of the foregoing discussion, and after observing that so
many teams in this survey have a manager present on a team, I moved
responses for "[team] makes proposals" item out of the compliance
cell in my earlier analysis, 277 and placed it in the fuzzy compliance
cell. Almost half the teams have this interactional method (thirty-
seven, or 47.4%). The same number also interact by reaching an in-
formal consensus.
A smaller percentage of teams engage in unambiguously safe
forms of interactions. Only one team (1.3%) limited itself to discuss-
ing matters without reaching decisions or even making suggestions.
Twenty-four teams (30.8%) offered suggestions. To the best of my
knowledge, no prior study has attempted to quantify the extent to
which teams interact with customers. Almost half the surveyed teams
(thirty-five, or 44.9%) do this.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 LeRoy, supra note 35, Fig. 2 at 246.
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Finding 4: Most teams are involved in "safe-harbor" functions such
as improving work processes and product or service quality.
Four out of five teams are involved in attempting to improve work
processes (sixty-four, or 82.1%) and product or service quality (sixty-
two, or 79.5%).
Finding 5: In addition to their involvement with "safe-harbor"
functions such as improving work processes and product or
service quality, most teams are involved in a variety of
functions that relate to aspects of the employment
relationship.
Team handling of employee scheduling is the most common of
these activities (fifty-four, or 69.2%), followed by safety and accident
prevention (thirty-nine, or 50%). Apart from these functions, teams
are much less likely to be involved with other functions. Team han-
dling of employee vacations is the next most frequent activity (twenty-
one, or 26.9%). A persistent minority of teams appear to be involved
with many functions. These include formulating and administering
policies for tardiness and absences (thirteen, or 16.7%) and more
general disciplinary matters (thirteen, or 16.7%), employee grievance
systems (twelve, or 15.4%), pay (nine, or 11.5%), health and fitness
(nine, or 11.5%), employee handbook (eight, or 10.3%), leave (six, or
7.7.%), and insurance benefits (five, or 6.4%).
Finding 6: Almost all teams are created either by management, or
by management and employees; virtually no teams are created
exclusively by employees.
Only two teams (2.6%) were created by employees. Management
had a hand in creating all other teams (thirty-eight, or 47.7% were
created by management and employees acting together, and the same
number were unilaterally created by management).
Finding 7: Teams are staffed by a variety of methods, with no single
method predominating; these include self-selection, peer-
selection, management-selection, and definition of job
duties.
Management selection of team members is the most common re-
cruitment method, but only half the surveyed teams (thirty-nine) use
this method. Moreover, other selection methods are used almost as
frequently: employees volunteer in thirty-two teams (41%), participate
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as part of their formal job duties in thirty teams (39%), or are selected
by peers in twenty-eight teams (35.9%).
Finding 8: Roughly 90% of teams are equally divided among those
that are essentially directed by management and those that are
essentially directed by employees; but within these spheres
of influence, the less dominant group rarely is
disenfranchised or marginalized in directing team activities.
Respondents were asked to consider separately the extent to
which managers and employees direct team activities. The purpose in
framing their assessment in this fashion was to encourage the respon-
dents to concentrate their thinking on these separate groups of peo-
ple. Overall, these dual assessments were consistent.
Roughly 90% of the teams divide equally into two spheres of in-
fluence, one controlled by management and one controlled by em-
ployees. Nearly half of the teams are perceived to be always directed
(six, or 7.9%) or usually directed (twenty-eight, or 36.8%) by manage-
ment; but nearly half of the teams are also perceived to be always di-
rected (six, or 7.9%) or usually directed (twenty-nine, or 37.7%) by
employees.
Although one group appears to be in control in teams, the less
dominant group rarely seems to be disenfranchised or marginalized
in directing teams. Employees occasionally direct almost half of the
teams (thirty-six, or 46.8%), and management occasionally directs al-
most one-third of the teams (twenty-five, or 32.9%). Further reinforc-
ing this conclusion, relatively few teams have one group controlling
team activities to the exclusion of the other group. In only seventeen
(22.4%) teams, management never or rarely directs activities. Even
fewer teams (seven, or 9.2%) have employees who never or rarely di-
rect activities.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
1. This survey discloses no evidence that teams are like company
unions from the 1930s. The small size of the surveyed teams found
here is similar to the findings of other studies. 278 Company unions, by
contrast, were typically engaged in large-scale settings. A 1935 Depart-
ment of Labor study surveyed 14,725 employers and found that com-
pany unions were single agencies that tended to concentrate in
278 See Thomas Li-Ping Tang & Amy Beth Crofford, Self-Managing Work Teams, EM-
PLOYMENT REL. TODAY, Dec. 1, 1995, at 29, 33 (studying teams at numerous corpora-
dons and reporting that team cells had an average of six members).
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establishments that employed 200-499 people.279 Other evidence in
this study tends to refute the notion that teams are reincarnations of
company unions. Finding 7, showing that employees control the activ-
ities of roughly half of the nonunion teams surveyed, and that employ-
ees exert little control in only one in ten teams, supports this
conclusion.
This finding has some import for the current debate on the
TEAM Act because unions claim that many nonunion teams are sim-
ply throw-backs to company unions.2 80 By lumping all or most teams
into this category, unions miss an opportunity to show that some teams
are used just as company unions were to interfere with organizing
efforts.2
8 1
Thus, their insistence that teams equate to company unions ap-
pears to be disengaged from the particulars of the bill they so fer-
vently oppose. One of the TEAM Act's key findings reflects labor's
concern that nonunion teams not be used for illegitimate purposes.2 82
Moreover, unions fail to recognize that the main protection against
company unions was written into the NLRA's statutory definition of a
labor organization, and the TEAM Act proposes no amendment of
section 2(5) . 2 83 Concerning this feature of the bill, I testified that:
Whereas Section 2 (5) prohibits an employer from "dealing with" em-
ployees concerning subjects such as pay, work conditions and griev-
ances, the TEAM Act creates a safe harbor only for an employee
involvement organization where management representatives and
employees "address matters of mutual interest." This is a meaningful
semantic difference. The term "dealing with" clearly connotes bar-
gaining and negotiating-that is, the process of making a proposal
279 U.S. Department of Labor, supra note 4, at 46 tbl. 4, data-cols. 7, 8 (showing
that only 11.5% of establishments with company unions had fewer than fifty employ-
ees, but 16.5% had 100-99 employees, 27.0% had 200-499 employees, and 14.7% had
500-999 employees).
280 See testimony of Hiatt and Muehlenkamp, supra note 18.
281 See supra notes 63-141, and cases in accompanying text.
282 In its proposed findings, section 6 of the TEAM Act states that "employers who
have instituted legitimate Employee Involvement programs have not done so to inter-
fere with the collective bargaining rights guaranteed by the labor laws, as was the case
in the 1930's when employers established deceptive sham 'company unions' to avoid
unionization." S. 295 and H.R. 634, 105th Cong. §6 (1997).
283 See The Teamwork For Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act of 1997: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997
WL 63032 (testimony of Michael H. LeRoy) ("An objective and careful analysis of this
bill shows... that the Section 2(5) definition of a labor organization remains abso-
lutely unchanged. This is a vital point. Thus, the legislative history behind this very
essential definition of a company union remains as pertinent in 1997 as it did in
1935.-).
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and receiving a counter-proposal. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
offers this definition of the verb form of deal: "to engage in
bargaining."
The verb phrase in the TEAM Act, "to address," has two alternative
definitions in Webster's Dictionay that fit this context, "to deal with,"
or "to communicate directly." The first definition does not fit for the
simple reason that these words have special significance under Sec-
tion 2(5), and as I stated, that section remains intact under the
TEAM Act. To adopt this interpretation would nullify Section 2(5),
which, of course, cannot happen under this proposed law. So, that
leaves "to communicate directly," and that, in fact, is what legitimate
Employee Involvement programs purport to do .... 2 8 4
I concluded that "[t]o discuss is synonymous with 'to communicate
directly'; it is not consistent with the phrase 'deal with.'"285
These facts lead to the conclusion that the TEAM Act is a limited
effort to legalize communication and collaboration between employ-
ees and managements in nonunion settings without diminishing the
NLRA's protections against sham or company unions.
2. Although this study finds no evidence that current teams are
like company unions, teams in this second survey differ markedly
from the teams I surveyed only two years ago. Remarkably, 46.2% of
the teams in this survey were created in this very short time. At a mini-
mum, this suggests that employers are creating new teams notwith-
standing Electromation's supposed chilling effect 2 8 6 The findings
presented here therefore lend some support to Senator Kennedy's ar-
gument that NLRB disposition of section 8(a) (2) cases is not as much
of a problem as TEAM Act supporters suggest.2 8 7
Another aspect of the findings undermine, however, the argu-
ment that this legislation is merely an issue in search of a real prob-
lem.2 88 Many more teams in this survey appear to be subject to
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 For a classic and overblown version of this argument, see Wellins' Senate testi-
mony, supra note 50.
287 LeRoy, supra note 35, at 244-51.
288 See S. REP. No. 105-12, at 30 (1997), where the minority Report, in a section
titled "The Chilling Effect is a Myth," argued:
Proponents have resorted to claiming that these few cases exert a "chilling
effect" on employers who want to establish employee involvement plans, but
supposedly do not because of concerns about section 8(a) (2). However, em-
ployee involvement programs are thriving under the current law. As the ma-
jority has admitted for over three years, more than 30,000 exist today, and
75% of employers use them-including over 96% of large employers. This
alone demonstrates that there is no chilling effect.
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section 8(a) (2) because they seem to be section 2(5) labor organiza-
tions. The problem is that more teams are being asked to handle a
wider range of subjects compared to teams in my first survey. Some of
these subjects, scheduling, for example, are expressly enumerated
under section 2(5)'s coverage of "hours of employment." The grow-
ing popularity of departures from the eight-hour workdaym-particu-
larly twelve-hour shifts289-suggests that the finding reported here is
not a fluke. In a related vein, the finding that one in four teams deter-
mines employee vacations also corresponds to other evidence showing
that teams are taking on this employment-related function.290
In addition to taking on more section 2(5) subjects, this study
presents more evidence that teams are meeting that provision's re-
quirements for "dealing with." Only a minute fraction of teams appear
to limit themselves to the safest form of interaction, that is, offering
only suggestions. The Board in DuPont explicitly treated employee
suggestions as a permissible form of interaction,29' but this survey
shows that fewer than one-third of teams engage in this interaction.
Thus, numerous teams-perhaps 50% or more-appear to meet all
the definitional requirements of a section 2 (5) labor organization.
As a complicating feature, however, even these teams continue to
handle work process and quality issues. Thus, they appear to comply
Id.
289 See Herbert R. Northrup, The Twelve-Hour Shift in the Petroleum and Chemical In-
dustries Revisited: An Assessment by Human Resource Management Executives, 42 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 640 (1989).
290 SeeSandra N. Phillips, Team Training Puts Fizz in Coke Plant's Future, PERSONNEL
J., Jan. 1996, at 87, available in 1996 WL 9819978 (relating one team's experience in
formulating and communicating a company's new vacation policy).
291 In this vein, the Board explained:
For example, a "brainstorming" group is not ordinarily engaged in dealing.
The purpose of such a group is simply to develop a whole host of ideas.
Management may glean some ideas from this process, and indeed may adopt
some of them. If the group makes no proposals, the "brainstorming" session
is not dealing and is therefore not a labor organization.
Similarly, if the committee exists for the purpose of sharing information
with the employer, the committee would not ordinarily be a labor organiza-
tion. That is, if the committee makes no proposals to the employer, and the
employer simply gathers the information and does what it wishes with such
information, the element of dealing is missing, and the committee would
not be a labor organization.
Likewise, under a "suggestion box" procedure where employees make
specific proposals to management, there is no dealing because the proposals
are made individually and not as a group.
E.I. DuPont & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993), available in 1993 WL 191471, at
*1-2.
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with Electromation. This leaves the impression, therefore, that many
teams operate in a zone of fuzzy compliance, where some characteris-
tics make them appear to be in compliance and others do not. Since
the post-Electromation Board has found, on at least one occasion, that a
partial lapse does not constitute a section 8(a) (2) violation, 292 it ap-
pears that some employers may be trying to expand the law by chal-
lenging the NLRB to accept inoffensive, mixed-compliance teams.
In addition, there is considerable evidence that many teams, in
addition to being section 2(5) labor organizations, also meet the
NLRB's test of unlawful domination under section 8(a) (2)- because in
about half the teams managers appoint employees to teams and also
direct team activities. Compared to company unions, however, cur-
rent teams lack stultifying control by employers. Instead, many ap-
pear to consensus-seeking, small-scale groups where there is a genuine
degree of power sharing between management and non-supervisory
employees.
Section 8(a) (2)'s prohibition against company unions is still
needed because recent NLRB cases show that this employer abuse still
exists; but the argument that it requires no modification ignores im-
portant changes that have taken place in the formation and adminis-
tration of nonunion employee groups that interact with employers.
Ironically, this argument also ignores a signal that the NLRB is send-
ing for more permissive uses of nonunion teams. 298 The Board, how-
ever, is without power to make significant new policy in this arena
without direction from Congress. Unless there is wider acceptance of
the TEAM Act's finding that "Employee Involvement is currently
threatened by legal interpretations of the prohibition against em-
ployer-dominated 'company unions,"' 294 the research findings
presented here suggest that a growing number of legitimate teams will
be subjected to a law that was not intended for them.
292 See Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R1B. 18 (1995), available in 1995 WL 789953.
293 Board Chairman William Gould recently stated:
In a nonunion situation, the sensible response ... is to allow employee
groups, with or without a management representative component, to discuss
anything they want. The more workers know about the enterprise and the
better they are able to participate in decision making, the more likely that
democratic values and competitiveness are enhanced. And if the law is sim-
plified, ordinary workers and small business people will be able to adapt to
their own circumstances and avoid reliance upon wasteful, expensive
litigation.
Remarks of NLRB Chairman Gould on Workplace Cooperation, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
208, at E-1, E-3 (Oct. 25, 1996).
294 S. 295, 104th Cong., § 2(a)(7) (1996).
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